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 CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS AND 
COMPETITION LAW  
 
Nicolas PETIT∗ 
Abstract (EN): this paper demonstrates that there are both theoretical and practical reasons to 
scrutinize, and possibly regulate, the conduct of the credit rating agencies under European Union 
competition law. 
Résumé (FR): cet article démontre, dans une perspective à la fois théorique et pragmatique, que les 
pratiques des agences de notation peuvent faire l’objet d’un contrôle, et le cas échéant, être régulées, 




The “Big Three” Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) rank highly on the “most wanted” list of 
policy leaders in the Western world.  Moody’s Investors Services (“Moody’s”), Standard & 
Poor’s (“S&P”) and Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”) are blamed for mistakenly downgrading 
sovereign States in the European Union (“EU”) and the United States (“US”), and in turn for 
plunging financial markets into a state of profound distress.  With swelling interest rates, 
downgraded States have been brought even closer to the brink of default, as if CRAs’ 
pessimistic predictions (some talk of “prophecies”) were self-fulfilling.1  Calls for regulatory 
intervention against CRAs have thus escalated, with proposals as diverse as the creation of 
government-sponsored CRAs,2 the dismantling of the CRA oligopoly,3 or tougher controls on 
sovereign ratings.4  In addition, it has been reported that a number of private investors have 
been exploring opportunities to enter this market.5 
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College of Europe. Director of the Brussels School of Competition (BSC). Nicolas.petit@ulg.ac.be.  The author 
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1
 J. de Haan and F. Amtenbrink, Credit Rating Agencies, De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 278, 
January 2011, p. 6. who explain the phenomenon as follows: “downgrade to below the investment-grade 
threshold often triggers immediate liquidation, leading to herd behaviour. This kind of behaviour may increase 
market volatility and may even cause a self-sustaining downward spiral of asset prices with potential negative 
effects for financial stability”. 
2
 Interview of M. Barnier, La tribune, Jeudi 7 Juillet 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/barnier/docs/interviews/20110707_latribune_fr.pdf 
3
 Interview of V. Reding, Härte gegen Griechen aus Sorge um Italien, Die Welt, 11.07.2011, available at 
http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/wirtschaft/article13479660/Haerte-gegen-Griechen-aus-Sorge-um-Italien.html 
4
 For an overview, see J. Rega, “The Rating Game”, mLex Magazine, July September 2011, pp.34-36.  
5
 Deutsche Welle, “New European ratings agency slated to open next year”, 19.07.2011, available at 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15250217,00.html 
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Interestingly, most proposals have focused on the adoption of a dedicated regulatory 
framework to address the issue.  In contrast, only a few of them envision remedial action 
pursuant to the competition rules.6  This is surprising, given that the market for rating services 
exhibits a range of structural – oligopolistic structure – and behavioral – parallel conduct – 
features prone to antitrust scrutiny.  In addition, the toolbox of antitrust agencies comprises 
flexible remedies which could be instrumental in regulating the CRA oligopoly.   
Against this background, the present paper seeks to explore the possibilities for remedial 
intervention against the CRAs under the competition rules.  To this end, it is divided in six 
parts.  Following this introduction, Part II provides an overview of the credit rating industry.  
Part III demonstrates that there is a possible economic case for antitrust intervention against 
the CRAs.  Part IV examines the doctrines of competition law that could be applied against 
CRAs.  Part V reviews possible remedies.  Part VI provides a conclusion.  The below analysis 
is conducted on the basis of EU competition law.  Subject to national legal idiosyncrasies, it 
applies mutatis mutandis to other competition law regimes.  
II. Overview of the Credit rating industry 
Definition – CRAs issue ratings to convey information on the ability of a debt issuer to repay 
its debt.7  Credit ratings help investors overcome the information asymmetry that exists 
between them and debt issuers. With the publication of specialized, independent and 
prospective assessments on debt issuers’ creditworthiness, CRAs reduce information costs, 
increase the pool of potential lenders/borrowers and promote liquidity on markets.8  
Market participants – The credit rating industry is a global business controlled by only a few 
players.9  Whilst one can enumerate approximately 74 CRAs throughout the world, the three 
major CRAs, namely Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, account for 94% of the global market.10  
Moody’s and S&P each hold a 40% market share.  Fitch, which became the third important 
                                                     
6
 D. Nelson, “EC sees no abuse in CRA actions, but monitors behaviour ‘every day’”, 12.07.2011, M-Lex.  See 
however, Huw Jones, Lawmakers urge competition probe of raters, Reuters, 21.07.2011, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/uk-raters-idUKTRE76J7R420110720 (about a call from the United 
Kingdom’s House of Lords' EU economic and financial affairs committee). 
7
 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF): “A credit rating measures the relative risk that an entity 
or transaction will fail to meet its financial commitments, such as interest payments and repayment of principal, 
on a timely basis”. See IMF, The uses and abuses of sovereign credit ratings, IMF Global Financial Stability 
Report, October 2010, p. 88. 
8
 Ibidem, p. 86. 
9
 For a historical account of the evolution of the industry, see B. Cohen and B. G. Carruthers, “Credit, 
Classification and Cognition: Credit Raters in 19th-Century America”, October 20, 2009, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525626.  
10
 For a full list, see IMF, Annex 3.1., p.118. 
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player in the early 2000s, is reported to control 15% of the market.11  Moody’s and S&P are 
US firms.12  Fitch is a majority-owned subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., a French firm.13 
Business model – Since the 1970s, most CRAs subscribe to the so-called “issuer pays” 
business model.  Firms and governments that issue debt – or more precisely the banks that are 
commissioned to issue securities on their behalf – pay CRAs to rate their credit-worthiness.  
Ratings are subsequently disclosed to the public for free.  In the past, the banks and the money 
market funds themselves carried out credit worthiness assessments.14  In a bid to cut costs, 
however, they progressively outsourced most, if not all, of their internal ratings activities to 
CRAs.   
Credit rating grids typically distinguish between two general types of grade, namely 
“Investment grade” and “Non investment grade” (or “junk bonds”).  Each CRA, however, 
uses a more accurate rating scale.  A common feature to all of them is a reliance on a 
combination of alphanumerical characters to reflect the credit worthiness of debt issuers (see 
table below).  Ratings are determined primarily using a 3-5 year time horizon – at least in case 
of S&P 
 
Table 1 – Overview of the Credit Ratings Grids of the “Big Three” CRAs15 
 
                                                     
11
 Hence, the expression the “Big Three”. OECD, Competition and Credit Rating Agencies, 
DAF/COMP(2010)29, 5 October 2010, p. 7. 
12
 Moody's is controlled by two US financial and investment companies, i.e. Berkshire Hathaway and Davis 
Selected Advisers. S&P is a division of the publicly traded McGraw-Hill Companies, a group active in the 
education, media and publication businesses.  
13
 J. Rega, “The Rating Game”, M-Lex Magazine, July September 2011, 34.  Fimalac S.A. is active in financial 
markets, investments and real estate. 
14
 Faith in ratings, Wall Street Journal, 23 September 2008. 
15
 Table found at http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=3&id=8 
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Investors that trade in financial products rely heavily on CRA ratings.  Portfolio governance 
and prudential regulation obligations indeed require investors to hold financial products rated 
by CRAs.16  As a result, debt issuers have little choice but to request ratings from the CRAs in 
exchange for a price.17  Moreover, given investors’ constant quest for high quality and 
independent assessments, debt issuers typically solicit ratings from two or three CRAs.18  
CRAs are thus commonly depicted as the “gatekeepers” of financial markets.19 
In recent years, the “issuer pays” model has been in the line of fire.  A popular analogy 
compares CRAs to teachers being paid by their students.20  For fear of losing business, CRAs 
would be reluctant to give poor grades to debt issuers.21  This conflict of interest was arguably 
at the core of the Subprime and Enron scandals, with junk bonds still assigned investment 
grades by CRAs days before the crisis began to unravel.  That said, moving from the “issuer 
pays” to an “investor pays” business model appears unworkable in practice.  This is because 
ratings are public goods.  Once a rating has been disclosed to an investor, there is nothing – in 
particular in today’s state of technological development – to do to prevent the subsequent 
dissemination of the ratings (through the “talk of the town”, the press, leaks from the staff) to 
other investors.  As a result, any investor contemplating to order a rating would eventually be 
discouraged to do so: (i) for fear that other investors will subsequently acquire the information 
for free; and (ii) anticipating that he will be able to free-ride on other investors’ rating 
orders.22  
Occasionally, CRAs also issue unsolicited ratings based on publicly available information 
only.  No consideration is provided by the debt issuer for such ratings.23  It is often advanced 
that CRAs issue unsolicited ratings with a view to increasing their customer base.  Debt 
issuers that have been unwillingly rated might be incentivized to become customers of CRAs, 
so that their rating is based on more accurate data in the future.   
                                                     
16
 OECD, p.57. 
17
 J. Hunt, “Credit rating agencies and the worldwide credit crisis: the limits of reputation, the insufficiency of 
reform, and a proposal for improvement”, Columbia Business Law Review, 2009, 1, pp. 109-209. 
18
 European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME), The Role of Credit Rating Agencies ESME’s report to 
the European Commission, June 2008, p. 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/report_040608_en.pdf  
19
 OECD, p.16. 
20
 J. Rega, supra. Other analogies can be drawn: the situation of CRAs is comparable to food/drugs safety 
agencies being remunerated by food and drug manufacturers. 
21
 On ratings, but also on other activities, such as consultancy services, etc.  CRAs occasionally advise on the 
creation of financial products (e.g. securities), and can thus be reluctant to assign poor grades to products they 
have helped creating. 
22
 Current remedial proposals thus include for instance a fine-tuning of the “issuer pays” model or move towards 
“platform pays” model, where issuers can no longer choose their rating agencies. 
23
 They generally concern sovereign bonds, although many countries have contractual relationships with CRAs. 
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Finally, CRAs also generate revenue from subscription fees for their publications or from 
consultancy and advisory services.24  CRAs for instance help debt issuers design financial 
products. 
Regulatory framework – Since many years, the “Big Three” CRAs have enjoyed regulatory 
protection. In 1975, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) established the 
“national recognized statistical rating organizations” status (NRSROs), and grandfathered 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch into such category.25  By virtue of specific legal requirements, debt 
issuers and other financial institutions active on US markets had to be rated by NRSROs.26  
As a result, CRAs enjoying the NRSROs status became, and still are today, compulsory 
trading partners for very many US corporations.  Similar pieces of legislation have been in 
force in the EU (such as the Basel II standardized approach for credit assessment).27  
Interestingly, the number of appointed NRSROs increased over time.28  In 2010, there were 
ten NRSROs.  That said, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch represent, by and large, the market 
standards.29  
Sovereign debt – CRAs also rate sovereign States.  Similarly to corporate ratings, the 
remuneration of sovereign ratings is not uniform. Not all countries have contractual 
relationships with the CRAs, and thus pay for ratings.30  In principle, countries pay for the 
ratings of the specific bonds they issue.  But countries normally do not pay for the general, 
unsolicited ratings which are assigned to them by the CRAs. 
Notwithstanding this, sovereign ratings exhibit significant differences from corporate ratings.  
They are due to the specific features of States in their position as borrowers.  On the one hand, 
                                                     
24
 Standard & Poor’s for subscribers only publication is The Outlook. It is published on a weekly basis 
(http://www.spoutlookonline.com/);  Fitch’s monthly publication is the Global Ratings Directory 
(http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/corporate/ProductsAndServices.faces?context=2&detail=14); Moody’s issues 
several publications on a regular basis, most of which are available free of charge 
(http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007400000597716.pdf). 
25
 L. White, “The credit rating industry: an industrial organization analysis”, Prepared for the Conference on 
“Rating Agencies in the Global Financial System” to be presented at the Stern School of Business, 1 June 2001, 
20 April 2011, p. 11 (http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10356).  
26
 In the EU, CRAs play a similar role. “Based on the Capital Requirement Directive, the Committee of 
European Banking supervisors (CEBS) has issued non-legally binding guidelines on the recognition of external 
credit assessment institutions.”  J. de Haan and F. Amtenbrink, op. cit.,, p. 7. 
27
 Patrick Van Roy, “Credit Ratings and the Standardised Approach to Credit Risk in Basel II”, ECB Working 
Paper Series, N°517/August 2005. 
28
 During the 25 years that followed the creation of the NRSROs category, the SEC designated only four 
additional firms as NRSROs. However, mergers among the entrants and with Fitch caused the number of 
NRSROs to return to the original three by year-end 2000.  
29
 L. White, “The Credit Rating Agencies”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 
2010, pp. 217 and 222. 
30
 European Commission, Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies, 5 November 2010 p. 14 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/cra/cpaper_en.pdf). 
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unlike firms, States cannot go bankrupt.  States benefit from a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence and can thus coerce citizens to pay taxes.31  This makes sovereign debt a safe 
investment. On the other hand, unlike firms, States cannot be coerced to pay their debts 
(unless war is waged).  Knowing this, States might just be unwilling to pay their debts.  This 
makes sovereign debt a risky investment.   
Against this background, the methodology employed to rate sovereign debt cannot be 
confined to a quantitative review of States’ finances.  It must also embrace their willingness to 
pay.32   CRAs thus scrutinize a range of additional qualitative factors such as the State’s 
institutional strength, political stability, fiscal and monetary flexibility and economic 
vitality.33  This methodological peculiarity is the main distinctive feature between sovereign 
and corporate ratings.   
III. The Case for Antitrust Intervention 
A variety of specific regulatory remedies have been discussed to address the risks of errors, 
“cliff effects” and financial instability arising from CRAs’ sometimes ominous predictions.  In 
contrast, policy makers have expressed little interest in antitrust intervention, although many 
of them have apportioned blame to the weak degree of competition that prevails in the 
industry.  This section shows that there is a case to be made for antitrust intervention in the 
credit rating industry.  First, CRAs exhibit prima facie features of significant market power 
(“SMP”), which is the main target of antitrust policy (A).  Second, antitrust intervention has a 
number of intrinsic advantages over other remedial routes, and can tackle several issues which 
sector specific regulatory proposals fail to address (B).  
A. The Prima Facie Features of Significant Market Power 
1. Significant Market Power, Information Goods and Reputational Damage 
Antitrust law combats SMP.  Firms holding SMP (“SMP firms”) can profitably set prices at 
levels that significantly exceed costs.  As a result, those customers whose reservation price is 
(i) inferior to the SMP firm’s price; (ii) and superior to the SMP firm’s costs are not served. 
                                                     
31
 M. Weber, Politics as Vocation, in the Vocation Lectures, Hackett Publishing, 2004, who defines the State as 
“a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory”.   In addition, in the globalized XXIth century economy, many States have become “too big to fail” 
and a country’s default represents a great systemic risk for other States.  Hence, government and international 
institutions are implicitly bound to rescue States on the brink of bankruptcy. 
32
 This factor reflects the risk of State default if the social/political cost of tax increases is too heavy. 
33
 Those factors lead CRAs to also hire groups of political scientists in addition to the usual teams of analysts. 
Moreover, it ought to be noted that a country’s debt repayment track record is an important indicator of 
willingness to pay. J. de Haan and F. Amtenbrink, op. cit., p. 10. 
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This is a problem because the SMP firm could render the share of demand that is not served 
better-off without itself being worse-off (i.e. make a loss).34  Hence, SMP firms may inflict 
allocative inefficiency on society – a situation referred to as a “deadweight loss” (see grey 
triangle below) – and thus represents a grave threat to economic welfare, and in particular 
consumer welfare.   
SMP is often associated with situations of entrenched monopoly positions or of secret, 
organized conspiracies (e.g. cartels).  Economists consider, however, that SMP can arise out 
of such polarised situations, particularly in situations of narrow oligopoly protected by 
barriers to entry/expansion.  In certain concentrated markets, oligopolists can raise prices, 
simply because customers cannot sanction them by diverting orders towards other players. 
 
 
Figure 1 – The allocative inefficiency of SMP 
 
Besides the textbook depiction of SMP as the ability to engage in above-cost pricing, 
competition economists consider that SMP can take a variety of forms, such as output 
reductions, limitations in innovation and advertisement expenditures, deterioration of 
product/service quality, etc.35  Since the early 20th century, a plethora of economic studies 
have attempted to represent the multifaceted dynamics of competition and market power 
across industries.   
With this background in mind, the economic literature on “information goods” provides a 
suitable framework for analyzing competition and market power in the credit rating industry.  
Put simply, an information good is a commodity whose main value is derived from the 
                                                     
34
 Given that those firms can freely increase their profits through price hikes, they have little, if any, incentives to 
cut costs (productive inefficiency) or to innovate (dynamic inefficiency) to attract new customers.   
35
 P. Hofer and M. Williams, “Minding Your Ps and Qs : Moving Beyond Conventional Theory to Capture the 
Non Price Dimensions of Market Competition”, in L. Wu (Ed.), Economics of Antitrust: Complex Issues in a 
Dynamic Economy, NERA Economic Consulting (2007). 
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information it contains (e.g. press, software, books, etc.).36  Credit ratings fall squarely within 
such category of good: they convey information on the creditworthiness of issuers of financial 
products. 
Importantly, information goods respond to specific competitive dynamics.  First, on 
information markets, price is not the sole driver of competition.  Suppliers compete almost 
equally, if not more, on the qualitative features of the information (e.g. accuracy, veracity, 
timeliness, etc.).  And in the credit rating industry, market players compete predominantly on 
the accuracy of their valuations.  As one observer puts it: “What investors want is forecast 
accuracy. At present they have no simple or straightforward way of doing that, (though large 
investors might do so by comparing the historical records of each of the large CRAs).”37   
Second, information goods are experience goods.  Customers cannot assess from the outset 
their ability to satisfy demand needs (textbook examples of experience goods include legal 
services, computer programmes, books, etc.).38  Hence, customers’ orders are often guided by 
reputation on those markets.  According to many observers, this reputational feature is of 
particular relevance in the credit rating industry.  S&P has been reported to claim that 
‘‘reputation is more important than revenues’’.39   
Forecast accuracy and reputation thus drive competition in the credit rating industry.  In a 
hypothetically competitive industry, high forecast accuracy should build a good reputation 
(amongst investors) which in turn should grow market share (with issuers). By parity of 
reasoning, poor forecast accuracy should lead to reputational damage (amongst investors) 
which should eventually translate into loss of market share (with issuers) and possibly lead to 
market exit.40  In this sense, the CRA industry is a typical example of a “two-sided market”, 
                                                     
36
 C. Shapiro and H. Varian, Information Rules, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1999 
seem to define information goods as “anything that can be digitized” and that is made the object of economic 
transactions (p.3). 
37
 C. Goodhart, “How, if at all, should Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs) be Regulated?”, LSE Financial Markets 
Group Paper Series, special paper 181, June 2008, p. 32 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/specialPapers/2008/sp181.pdf. Adding that “So most investors fall back 
on reliance on brand names, which reinforces oligopoly”. 
38
 OECD, p.7: “credit ratings are experience goods i.e. the quality of the rating is only revealed ex-post using a 
large sample. Simply because a default does not occur it does not mean that a good rating should be given. 
Therefore reputation for quality built on a long track record is the crucial competitive advantage”. 
39
 See B. Becker and T. Milbourn, op. cit. and their references p. 5 (quoting also former executive vice president 
of Moody’s Thomas McGuire: ‘‘what’s driving us is primarily the issue of preserving our track record. That’s 
our bread and butter’’). 
40
 The demise of the big auditing firm Arthur Andersen in the wake of the Enron bankruptcy in 2002 provides a 
very good illustration of this.   
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where reputation on one side of the market (investors) drives sales on the other side of the 
market (issuers).41 
Now, in an industry subject to SMP, the virtuous circle of competition is broken.  A CRA’s 
inability to provide accuracy in its forecasts, and the ensuing reputational damage it causes 
amongst investors does not translate into lower sales to issuers.  This is because absent 
competition from actual or potential competitors, issuers have nowhere to divert ratings 





As will be seen below, there are grounds to believe that the credit rating industry is 
susceptible to situations of SMP.42  Beyond classic structural factors such as market 
concentration and barriers to entry/expansion, its track record in terms of ratings accuracy and 
reputational damage is consistent with the existence of SMP.  
2. The Structural Features of SMP: Market Concentration and Entry Barriers  
Several structural features of the credit rating industry support a suspicion of SMP.  To start 
with, the credit rating industry is often described as a “shared”, “narrow” oligopoly.43 Market 
concentration is extremely high.  Moody’s and S&P are reported to hold 80% of the market.44  
Fitch has a market share of approximately 15%.  With this, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(“HHI”) lies at around 3400, a level which generally triggers the interest of competition 
authorities.45  Of course, those figures fail to reflect the existence of 74 CRAs across the 
world.  However, most of those CRAs are not active on a global scale or simply rate specific 
products.  Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are the sole global, multi-service CRAs.46   
                                                     
41
 A two-sided market can be defined as an economic platform that has two distinct groups of user that provide 
one other with network benefits (e.g. payment card systems).  
42
 Subject to the various informational caveats that should apply to any verification of the existence of SMP.   
43
 OECD. pp.14 and 39. 
44
 OECD. p.12.  
45
 Assuming that one firm holds the remaining 5%, the upper bound of the HHI is 402 + 402 + 152 + 52=  3450.  
Assuming that 5 firms hold respectively 1% of the remaining 5%, the lower bound of the HHI 402 + 402  + 152 + 
12 + 12 + 12 + 12 + 12 = 3430.   
46
 They have a uniquely broad product coverage, which makes them a priority point of reference for investors. 
See IMF, Box 3.1. 
Reputation 
amongst investors  
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Interestingly, some observers have even used the notion of “partner monopoly” to describe 
the CRAs’ market position.47  Since many issuers solicit two (or more) ratings, each of the 
“big three” CRAs often serves the entire market.  Hence, the credit rating industry would 
comprise a series of partner, or adjacent, monopolies.  In the words of economists, the ratings 
provided by the “big three” CRAs would not be substitutes for one another from the 
viewpoint of issuers.  In this sense, issuers are in the same position as sellers of other services 
(e.g. hotels, restaurants, music artists, etc.) who seek to be referenced and rated in all available 
guides, directories, journals, etc. (e.g. gastronomic guides, tourist guides, music magazines, 
etc.). 
Second, the credit rating industry is characterized by high barriers to entry/expansion.  Those 
obstacles to entry/expansion have been abundantly documented in the economic literature and 
it would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them here.   Without wading into too 
much detail, there are five types of barrier to entry/expansion that protect the “big three” from 
competition: (i) informational expertise, including the incumbent CRAs’ control over a wealth 
of strategic information on issuers, and the time needed for prospective entrants to acquire 
such information;48 (ii) brand loyalty towards incumbent CRAs in a market where experience 
matters;49 (iii) transaction costs savings achieved by issuers in dealing only with a few 
CRAs;50 (iv) investors’ cognitive limits, including their unwillingness to spend large 
resources to understand, interpret and compare many different rating standards; 51 and (v) 
regulatory obstacles in the US, Europe and Japan where only a limited number of CRAs 
(respectively 10, 4  and 5) are officially recognized as credit assessment institutions.52 
                                                     
47
 V. Padelli, “A Cerberus stands at the Doors of the Financial System: a New Challenge for the Regulation 
Authorities”, mimeo, p.11. 
48
 IMF, p. 98 
49
 L. White, “The Credit Rating Agencies”, op. cit., p. 217. The market for credit analyses is one “where 
potential barriers to entry like economies of scale, the advantages of experience, and brand name reputation are 
important features”. 
50
 K. Lannoo, op. cit., p. 2 “Rating agencies provide this information and thus provide huge savings in 
transaction costs. However, not many ratings agencies can exist, as transaction savings would disappear”; 
OECD, p. 7. “Corporate issuers build a trust relationship with one or two CRAs but are unwilling to be rated by 
more. However building this relationship involves valuable executive management time”. 
51
 K. Lannoo, op. cit., p. 2: investors themselves might have some preference for a concentrated market because 
if “dozens of ratings agencies were active, market participants and policy-makers might fund many ratings for 
each borrower and this would make it also difficult for borrowers to provide a clear signal to the market about 
their creditworthiness”. OECD, p.7: “Investors value comparability and consistency of ratings across 
geographical segments and instruments. Ratings from a given CRA provide a common standard to interpret risk. 
Investors are unwilling to spend large resources to interpret many different standards, all else equal, the larger 
the “ installed base” of ratings from a given CRA, the greater the value to investors”. 
52
 See IMF, 2010, Box 3.1. In addition, until 2006 in the US, the criteria used by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to designate new NRSROs remained opaque, and has thus possibly discouraged entry.  L. 
White, “The Credit Rating Agencies”, op. cit., p. 217: “in creating the NRSRO designation, the Securities and 
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To a certain extent, the growth of Fitch as a third force in the early 2000s undermines 
somewhat the view that there are high barriers to entry on the market.  However, it ought to 
be noted that (i) it took decades for Fitch to achieve its market position; (ii) Fitch is primarily 
perceived as a fringe player by investors;53 and (iii) in the recent financial crisis, Fitch has 
been the most seriously impacted CRA, which suggests that its market position remains quite 
fragile.54   
3. The Behavioral Performance of SMP: Poor Rating Quality and Ineffective 
Reputational Discipline 
The performance of the credit rating industry in recent years is also consistent with the 
distinguishing features of SMP.  As explained previously, the forces that shape competition in 
the credit rating industry are closely linked with ratings accuracy and reputational issues.55  In 
a competitive industry, CRAs are supposed to fight for market share on the basis of ratings 
accuracy and reputation.  CRAs strive to avoid ratings errors that undermine reputation, and 
trigger retaliation from customers who relocate rating orders to actual or potential 
competitors, sponsor entry or – although less probable – vertically integrate to internalize the 
ratings function.  In contrast, in an industry subject to SMP, CRAs that make rating errors and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Exchange Commission had become a significant barrier to entry into the bond rating business in its own right. 
Without the benefit of the NRSRO designation, any would-be bond rater would likely remain small-scale. New 
rating firms would risk being ignored by most financial institutions (the “buy side” of the bond markets); and 
since the financial institutions would ignore the would-be bond rater, so would bond issuers (the “sell side” of 
the markets).” See also p.222: “In early 2003 the SEC designated a fourth “nationally recognized statistical 
rating organization”: Dominion Bond Rating Services, a Canadian credit rating firm. In early 2005 the SEC 
designated a fifth NRSRO: A.M. Best, an insurance company rating specialist. The SEC’s procedures remained 
opaque, however, and there were still no announced criteria for the designation of a NRSRO.  Tiring of this 
situation, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which was signed into law in September 2006. 
The Act instructed the SEC to cease being a barrier to entry, specified the criteria that the SEC should use in 
designating new “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations,” insisted on transparency and due 
process in these SEC’s decisions, and provided the SEC with limited powers to oversee the incumbent 
NRSROs—but specifically forbade the SEC from influencing the ratings or the business models of the NRSROs”. 
53
 Bongaerts, D.G.J., Cremers, K.J.M. & Goetzmann, W.N. (2011). Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit 
Ratings. The Journal of Finance, forthcoming (reporting that Fitch plays the role of a “tie breaker” for investors 
when S&P and Moody’s achieve inconsistent ratings). 
54
 OECD, p.12. 
55
 For years, the threat of reputational damage has been perceived as a reliable disciplinary mechanism in the 
credit rating industry. The basic idea was then that “agencies have an overriding incentive to maintain a 
reputation for high-quality, accurate ratings. If investors were to lose confidence in an agency’s ratings, issuers 
would no longer believe they could lower their funding costs by obtaining its ratings. As one industry observer 
as put it, “every time a rating is established, the agency’s name, integrity, and credibility are on the line and 
subject to inspection by the whole investment community””. Quite ironically, the comment then concluded: 
“Over the years, the discipline provided by reputational considerations appears to have been effective, with no 
major scandals in the ratings industry”.  R. Cantor and F. Packer, “The Credit Rating Industry”, FRBNY 
Quarterly Review, Summer-Fall 1994, p. 4. A similar view has been expressed by J. Coffee: “These 
professionals develop “reputational capital” over many years and many clients that leads investors to rely on 
them, in part because investors know that the gatekeeper will suffer a serious reputational injury if it is 
associated with a fraud or unexpected insolvency”. J. Coffee, Testimony Before the Senate Banking Committee 
On September 26, 2007 “The Role and Impact Of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets”, p. 
1. 
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endure reputational losses face, however, no retaliation from customers and end up 
maintaining their market position and profits.56  In our model, CRAs can commit type I 
(unjustified downgrading or underrating) and/or type II (unjustified upgrading or overrating) 
ratings errors. 
Against this background, the history of the credit rating industry provides some empirical 
evidence of SMP.57  With hindsight, the “big three” CRAs systematically failed to forecast, or 
underestimated, the severe financial events that have damaged the global economy over the 
past fifteen years.58  CRAs did not foresee the Asian crisis in 1997.59  They also failed to 
predict the high-profile corporate failures of Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing.60  More 
recently, the CRAs still assigned an A rating to Lehman Brothers only a month before its 
collapse.61  And just days before the Subprime crisis unraveled, a large number of financial 
products which are now rated “junk” enjoyed the highest investment rates in the ratings of the 
various CRAs (see figure 2 hereafter).62   
                                                     
56
 In the conventional SMP model described above, a firm could be said to hold SMP if, failing to satisfy market 
demand, it nonetheless achieved supra-competitive profits.  Now, if we transpose this to the credit rating industry 
– where demand satisfaction is quality-driven rather than price-driven – a SMP situation should be deemed to 
arise when despite ratings errors and reputational losses, a CRA faces no change in its market position and 
profits. 
57
 Given the lack of data, we cannot review here the consequences of the recent, serious error of S&P, which 
decided to downgrade the US government rating despite a $2 trillion error. 
58
 In addition, CRAs have also been criticized for responding with a considerable time lag, i.e. ratings were not 
immediately downgraded once the problems in the sub-prime market became clear. 
59
 The CRAs later exacerbated the crisis when they downgraded the countries in the midst of the financial 
turmoil. Bank of England, p.8 (and references). 
60
 P. Deb, M. Manning, G. Murphy, A. Penalver and A. Toth, Whither the credit rating industry?, Financial 
Stability Paper No. 9 – March 2011, Bank of England, p.8 (and references). Enron was still rated investment 
grade until four days before it declared bankruptcy. Similarly, both WorldCom and Global Crossing were still 
rated investment grade not long before their respective failures.  
61
 A. J. Bahena, “What Role Did Credit Rating Agencies Play in the Credit Crisis?”, mimeo March 2010. 
62
 IMF, 2010, Figure 3.1.: over three quarters of all private-label residential mortgage backed securities issued in 
the United States from 2005 to 2007 that were rated AAA by S&P are now rated below BBB-, that is, below 
investment grade. 
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Figure 2 – 2010 rating of former AAA-rated mortgage backed securities 
 
Without doubt, such type II errors inflicted reputational harm on the CRAs.63   Yet, unlike in a 
competitive market, they were without real consequences.  Despite the Internet Bubble, 
Enron‘s bankruptcy and the Subprime crisis, the “big three” CRAs have maintained very 
significant and symmetrical market shares.64  Industry structure has remained stable, with 
little, if no, entry attempts.  Finally, the “big three” CRAs have maintained large profits 
despite a small decline following the Subprime crisis in 2007 (see figure 3 hereafter).65  
 
                                                     
63
 For instance, observers report that the stock price of Moody’s reacts negatively to rating actions that are 
perceived to indicate low rating quality . G. Löffler, “Can Market Discipline Work in the Case of Rating 
Agencies? Some Lessons from Moody’s Stock Price”, University of Ulm, October 2009, p. 19. 
64
 In relative terms, the various CRAs have achieved similar profits throughout the years, which indicate that 
market positions have remained very stable. See figure2. 
65
 Figure taken from P. Deb, M. Manning, G. Murphy, A. Penalver and A. Toth, op. cit. Forecasts also suggest 
that the “big three” CRAs’ profits should increase in upcoming years. See A. van Duyn, Rating agencies bullish 
on year ahead, Financial Times, 03.02.2011. 
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Figure 3 – CRAs profits66 
Empirical evidence thus suggests that the reputational harm mechanism which should 
discipline CRAs in the event of ratings errors is ineffective.67  In our opinion, the key 
explanatory factor for this lies in the existence of SMP, and in the weak degree of competition 
that prevails on the market.68  Given the close identity of the “big three” CRAs’ ratings, as 
well as the need to rely on 2 or 3 ratings, it is futile for disgruntled users (investors and 
issuers) to threaten to divert ratings orders from one CRA to the other.  Moreover, disgruntled 
users cannot threaten to sponsor new entrants or to vertically integrate in light of the high 
barriers to entry discussed above.  Insulated from competition, CRAs can make senseless 
predictions without ever being sanctioned by users, who are wholly captive of their 
evaluations.  In summary, the “big three” CRAs enjoy a classic “situational rent”, which is 
the paradigmatic example of SMP.   
4. Alternative Theories 
A number of studies have a different reading of the functioning of the credit rating industry.  
We review them in turn hereafter. 
4.1. Ineffective Rules on Civil Liability generate Ratings Negligence 
The view often holds sway that the problem of the credit rating industry does not originate in 
a lack of competition, but rather in the fact that CRAs are immune to civil (or criminal) 
liability in the event of rating errors.69  Insulated from such constraint, CRAs’ have little 
incentive to act with restraint and caution in their ratings.70   
                                                     
66
 Source, P. Deb, M. Manning, G. Murphy, A. Penalver and A. Toth, supra p.8. 
67
 J. de Haan and F. Amtenbrink, op. cit., p.8. Many commentators share the view that the reputational 
mechanism currently fails to play its role: “it may be argued that CRAs must safeguard their credibility with 
investors as their ratings would otherwise be of no value in the market. In this perspective CRAs must balance 
any short-term gain from satisfying the issuer with its long-run reputation in the market. Yet, it is doubtful 
whether the potential loss of reputation sufficiently restrains CRAs and can indeed function as an effective form 
of sanction. 
68
 Other observers agree that a lack of competition is the key factor preventing reputation from producing any 
kind of constraining effect on CRAs. See S. Utzig, “The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies: A European Banking Perspective”, ADBI Working Paper Series No. 188, January 2010, p. 6 “Self-
regulation does not work effectively when the pressure of reputation as a controlling power exists only to a 
limited degree due to a lack of competition”.  U. Blaubrock, “Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, December, vol. 11.3, 2007, p. 6 (http://www.ejcl.org) (“the 
dominant agencies do not have to fear any significant qualitative cut-throat competition, with the consequence 
that the temptation exists to keep their resource input down.”). 
69
 F. Partnoy, “How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers”, Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-46, May 2006, p. 61. Like the media, CRAs have long been protected from 
litigation for their opinions and analyses (except where a voluntary fraud could be evidenced). The Dodd-Frank 
Act passed in 2010 aimed at redressing this litigation privilege. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, SEC. 933; D. Martin and M. Franker, “Dodd-Frank Issue Brief: 
Requirements Affecting Credit Rating Agencies”, Council of Institutional Investors, April 2011, p. 2, 
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This, however, does not mean that there is no SMP.  Rather, the lack of effective liability for 
rating errors further exacerbates the competition problem outlined above.  In the credit rating 
industry, disgruntled users are deprived of both the economic – i.e. competition – and legal – 
i.e. civil liability proceedings – retaliation mechanisms available on most markets.   
As things stand, at any rate, stronger liability rules are unlikely to ever alter the incentive 
structure of CRAs.  In most jurisdictions, civil (or criminal) liability only kicks in at a certain 
threshold of negligence or willful misconduct.  Hence, stronger liability rules can correct little 
but the crudest rating errors, and are wholly ineffective in eradicating less blatant mistakes 
(rating inaccuracies, inexpediencies, etc.).  Moreover, CRAs’ immunity from civil (or 
criminal liability) is often justified on the ground of the right to free speech, which is 
protected by constitutional statutes.71 
4.2. Competitive Entry degrades Ratings Quality 
Overview of the Literature – Several economists make the counter-intuitive point that 
increasing competition in the credit rating industry is undesirable.  BECKER and 
MILBOURN adduce empirical evidence that the entry of Fitch on the market caused a 
decrease in ratings quality through “ratings inflation” (upgrading of rated securities without 
any apparent justification).72  To explain this puzzling finding, the authors claim that the jolt 
of competition instilled by the entry of Fitch reduced the profitability prospects of incumbent 
CRAs. With weaker profitability forecasts, incumbent CRAs thus reduced investments in 
costly short term reputational activities, i.e. the production of high quality information (an 
“incentive to invest” problem).73  Alternatively, the authors argue, perhaps more convincingly, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(http://cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/Dodd-Frank%20-
%20Requirements%20Affecting%20CRAs.pdf).  However, the current Republican majority is working on a Bill 
which would reinstate the prior legal regime. K. DRAWBAUGH, “Challenges to Dodd-Frank surface in 
Congress”, Reuters, 15 March 2011 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/15/us-financial-regulation-debit-
idUSTRE7273T120110315). In Europe, see European Commission, Public Consultation on Credit Rating 
Agencies, op. cit., p. 24. In the EU, work is currently under way to study whether it is necessary to introduce a 
civil liability regime to ensure that CRAs are liable for the damage caused by ratings errors. At the national level 
only one Member State has recently introduced a specific civil liability regime for CRAs: “In other Member 
States there is ongoing discussion whether CRAs could be held liable vis a vis investors and in a third group of 
Member States civil liability of CRAs towards investors seems to be legally impossible”.  More fundamentally 
however, the culture of private enforcement is less widespread in the EU. Hence, the constraint that would be 
exercised by civil liability rules in the EU would probably be less effective than in the US. 
70
 OECD, p.16.  
71
 Under the First Amendment of the US constitution and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU.  Several rulings have actually accepted the idea that the CRA business is financial publishing and have 
validated the argument. Idem, p. 66.   
72
 B. Becker and T. Milbourn, “How did increased competition affect credit ratings ?”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2011, forthcoming. 
73
 However, no quantitative evidence is advanced in support of this speculation (for instance, on investments in 
information), and the thesis rests on the wholly disputable theoretical assumption that reputational losses are of 
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that in line with increased competition, incumbent firms have sought to secure their customer 
base, and have thus increased their ratings to reflect issuers’ preferences rather than genuine 
credit quality (a “revenue bias” problem).74   
BONGAERTS et. al. also rely on econometrics to show that the introduction of Fitch on the 
market has neither improved the quality of information nor reduced uncertainty.  Rather, firms 
primarily use Fitch ratings to bypass the negative effects of regulatory requirements when 
their financial product has been rated by S&P and Moody’s at opposite sides of the 
investment grade boundary, and might as a result not be admissible for trading with certain 
financial institutions (a “certification” problem).  
Finally, BOLTON et al. argue formally that a monopoly is preferable to a duopoly in the 
credit rating industry.75  This is because a duopoly provides more opportunities for the issuer 
to shop around and mislead trusting investors (a “ratings shopping” problem).  This latter 
finding, however, has been discarded by recent studies, which show that ratings shopping 
does not happen where ratings are unsolicited and financial information is publicly available 
(for instance, in the market for corporate bonds).76 The ratings shopping hypothesis is thus 
only relevant in a subset of markets.77 
Critical Assessment – On many counts, the above studies are marred by shortcomings.78  To 
name but a few, rather than devising ratings quality criteria, they rely on crude and imperfect 
proxies.79  Also, the representativeness of their findings is questionable,80 in particular 
because they do not deal with “ratings deflation” which is the new paradigm of the credit 
                                                                                                                                                                      
lesser concern when there is competition. Alternative research suggests that several forces are at play, acting in 
diametrically opposed directions. “In fact, depending on parameters, ratings quality can be higher either under 
monopoly or duopoly”. “Intuitively, the value of milking a reputation for current returns is higher for a 
monopolist. This is a force that suggests that the monopolist would produce lower quality ratings. On the other 
hand, the value of maintaining reputation to gain future rewards is also higher for a monopolist, suggesting that a 
duopolist produces higher quality ratings”. H. Bar-Isaac and J. Shapiro, “Ratings Quality over the Business 
Cycle”, April 2010, pp. 20-21 (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~hbar-isa/HBJS_CRAcycle.pdf)   
74
 B. Becker and T. Milbourn, op. cit.  
75
 P. Bolton, X. Freixas, and J. Shapiro, 2008, “The Credit Rating Game” unpublished manuscript, p.38. In turn, 
rating shopping decreases the quality of ratings, through ratings inflation. V. Skreta and L. Veldkamp, 2009. 
“Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 678-695, July. 
76
 C. Spatt, “Discussion of ‘Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation’”, (2009) 
Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 696-699; Beckers and Milbourn, op. cit., pp.8 and 9;  Bongaerts, Cremers 
and Goetzmann confirm this empirically. 
77
 For instance, in structured products markets. 
78
 For instance, one cannot rule out collusion, tacit or explicit, between the three players on “ratings inflation”.   
79
 Those studies use ratings inflation and indexation with bond prices as proxies for ratings quality. However, 
they fail to reflect on the substance of what makes a “good” rating for investors: expediency, consistency across 
rated instruments, etc. 
80
 The study of Becker and Milbourn, for instance, only covers corporate bonds and not structured products. 
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rating industry.81  Finally, those studies test an entry scenario with n+1 firms, but provide no 
guidance on an entry scenario with n +2; n + 3; and so on.  
More fundamentally, the above theories are somewhat confusing.  In fact, their authors argue 
in parallel that competition must generally be strengthened, and entry promoted, because it 
reduces oligopolistic rents and adds information on financial markets.82 
Those conflicting pronouncements can nonetheless be reconciled.  On close examination, 
what the above studies stress is that whilst competitive entry is a genuinely good thing, 
several industry-specific practices/regulations sabotage its welfare-enhancing effects and 
trigger inefficiency.  PAGANO and VOLPIN provide ample evidence of this:83 the revenue 
bias problem arises primarily from the fact that CRAs are paid by issuers;84 the certification 
problem stems from regulatory instruments, which overly rely on credit ratings; the ratings 
shopping problem is caused by the fact that issuers need not disclose all their ratings, and can 
thus conceal poor ratings until they obtain a better one. 
On top of this, the complexity of financial products, the protection of CRAs as official credit 
assessment institutions, and the lack of expertise of investors also contribute to ratings 
inflation dynamics.85  
Public Policy Implications – In our opinion, the above works confirm that there is a 
competition problem in the credit ratings sector: the industry exhibits features which distort 
competition, in turning market entry – an efficient, good thing – into an inefficient and 
negative thing.86  
                                                     
81
 Does the current cycle of “ratings deflation” corroborate or invalidate their findings?  Also, is “ratings 
deflation” a sign of high or low ratings quality under competition? 
82
 See IMF, p.98; Beckers and Milbourn, op. cit., p.10.  According to the EU Commission, one of the main 
reasons for public authority intervention is to “increase competition in the rating market and increase the 
number of ratings per instrument so that users of ratings will be able to rely on more than one rating for the 
same instrument”.  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies {SEC(2010) 678} {SEC(2010) 679} /* 
COM/2010/0289 final - COD 2010/0160 */, point 4.3.2.  On information wealth, one may also consider that if 
competition leads to lesser “vertical” investment from each CRA in information, it may be counterbalanced by a 
higher level of “horizontal” investment of all the CRAs in information. 
83
 M. Pagano and P. Volpin, “Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options”, mimeo, October 2009. 
84
 This problem is further aggravated by the fact that issuers do not pay CRAs upfront for their rating, but rather 
payment is contingent on the content of the report. 
85 V. Skreta and L. Veldkamp, op. cit.. M. Pagano and P. Volpin, op. cit., p.9.  
86
 The IMF said just this when it stated that “looking ahead, enhanced competition would be welcome, with a few 
caveats […] measures should be taken to discourage such rating shopping, including requiring disclosure about 
any preliminary ratings.”  IMF, p.98. 
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This implies that specific measures must complement possible interventions seeking to 
promote market entry (e.g. creation of new CRAs, be they public or private).87  In this 
context, because competition rules regulate business models that give rise to anticompetitive 
effects, it is not foolish to rely on such rules to address those market practices, such as the 
“issuer-pays” model, that prevent competitive entry from delivering efficiency.  In parallel, 
sector specific measures can be targeted at regulatory frameworks which subvert the positive 
effects of entry. 
To conclude, those that claim that competition is undesirable in the credit rating industry 
make a basic causation mistake, which is akin to prohibiting unfit, overweight persons from 
jogging, simply because it risks inflicting on them joint pain and other minor physical trauma.  
Jogging is good, but it only has health-improvement effects if carried out under a tailor-made 
training programme, complemented by suitable equipment and diet.  
5. Conclusion 
The credit rating industry displays symptoms of SMP.  The three factors of “substantial 
market power” (also referred to as a “dominant position”) underlined in the Commission’s 
Guidance Communication on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(“TFEU”), are manifestly present: (i) large market position of incumbent firms; (ii) barriers to 
entry and expansion; (iii) lack of countervailing power.88  There is thus a patent competition 
problem in the credit rating industry.  This problem is further compounded by the fact that 
several industry-specific features upset the efficiency-enhancing effects of competitive entry.  
At least conceptually, it is thus justified to rely on the competition rules to investigate the 
credit rating industry and, as the case may be, envision remedial intervention.   
B. Antitrust Intervention v. Sector Specific Regulation? 
1. Background 
The CRAs’ repeated ratings errors, and their possible contribution to the exacerbation of 
market difficulties, are no longer disputed.  There is today a broad consensus amongst 
stakeholders that something must be done to fix the market failures that beset the credit rating 
                                                     
87
 Idem: “Enhanced competition would need to be combined with tougher measures against rating shopping”. 
88
 See Guidance Communication on the Commission’s enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, C(2009) 864 final,  para. 12 and following. 
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industry.89  The question remains open however whether this should be done under sector 
specific regulatory instruments and/or under the competition rules.  As explained previously, 
there is a good case for intervention under both sets of instruments. 
In recent years, experts from all sides have toiled with devising sector specific regulatory 
proposals in relation to conflicts of interest (the flaws of the “issuer-pays” model), cliff-
effects arising from portfolio governance and prudential regulations, transparency on rating 
procedures and methodologies, rules on official recognition as credit rating institutions, 
oversight ineffectiveness, civil liability regimes, etc.90   
In contrast, however, stakeholders have been remarkably shy when it comes to antitrust 
intervention.91  Beyond high-level policy calls to dissolve the credit ratings oligopoly,92 very 
few competition-related remedies have been discussed.  This is all the more unfortunate, 
given the intrinsic limits of regulatory approaches (2) and the comparative merits of 
competition enforcement (3).  
2. The Intrinsic Limits of Sector-Specific Regulatory Remedies 
Regulatory initiatives are fraught with effectiveness (a) and process (b) limitations.   
a). Effectiveness Issues 
The adoption of sector-specific regulatory instruments may have unintended anticompetitive 
consequences.  New regulatory obligations on CRAs may further shield existing market 
players from external competition, through the introduction of legal barriers to entry on 
prospective firms (e.g. search, advice and compliance costs).93  
                                                     
89
 Although there are divergences in terms of approaches. Industry participants and sector-specific regulators 
seem, on the one hand, to support self regulation. On the other hand, policy representatives have voiced support 
for ambitious reforms which would lead to the adoption of mandatory sector specific regulatory instruments.  
90
 Over the last few years, numerous proposals have been made to adapt the regulatory framework for CRAs. 
Several improvements have been introduced in EU Regulation 1060/2009 and the US Dodd-Frank Act which 
introduce provisions regarding the registration of CRAs, conflict of interests, transparency. Regulation No 
1060/2009, 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies, OJ, 17 November 2009, L 302/1. 
91
 Whilst also recognizing that the lack of competition in the credit rating industry is a problematic issue. See 
IMF: “the significant increase over time in references to credit ratings in rules and regulations, combined with 
limited competition, has affected the business model of CRAs by creating a more or less “guaranteed market” 
with few incentives to compete on the basis of rating quality”, p.94. “Looking ahead, enhanced competition 
would be welcome, although there are a few caveats”, p.98.  
92
 Commissioner Reding is reported to have supported “dismantl[ing] the rating agencies”. Attempts to achieve 
dissolution can take very many forms, through the dismantlement of the existing oligopoly into smaller pieces, 
or with the setting up of new agencies, be they public or private. A number of Member States (Poland, Germany) 
as well as the EU internal market Commissioner support the creation of an EU public agency. 
93
 K. Lannoo, Credit Rating Agencies. Scapegoat or free-riders ? ECMI Commentary No. 20/9, October 2008, p. 
3: warning that:  “Functional regulation for a sector that is as specific as rating agencies could lead to 
undesirable side effects. It has been argued that it further strengthens the quasi-statutory role of these bodies, 
which may reduce their alertness. It reinforces the barriers to entry whereas the opposite should be done”. 
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But this is not all. Insofar as internal competition amongst the big three is concerned, new 
regulatory obligations may further chill competition through a deterioration of the 
oligopolists’ cost structure (e.g. compliance costs).  More importantly, efforts to regulate 
rating procedures and methodologies may restrict flexibility and innovation in the assessment 
of information, and in turn reduce competition94  
Finally, softer approaches which promote self-regulation, best practices and industry 
standards are ill-suited to solve competition issues.  After all, when industry players agree to 
abide by common standards, they voluntarily reduce the scope for competition on the market.  
Competition specialists know all too well that beyond the anticompetitive effects of 
standardization processes, such collaboration creates opportunities for market players to meet 
and exchange sensitive information or to implement subtle boycott strategies.  This is 
certainly a sensible consideration to bear in mind, given the strong stakeholder support for 
self-regulation in current policy debates. 95 
b).  Process Issues 
The adoption of sector-specific regulatory instruments is subject to a major procedural 
downside.  In the EU, regulatory reforms undergo a burdensome decision-making process 
where the various EU institutions each have a say.  As a result, the passing of Directives or 
                                                     
94
 L. White, “The Credit Rating Agencies”, op. cit., p. 223: “Regulatory efforts to fix problems, by prescribing 
specified structures and processes, unavoidably restrict flexibility, raise costs, and discourage entry and 
innovation in the development and assessment of information for judging the creditworthiness of bonds. 
Ironically, such efforts are likely to increase the importance of the three large incumbent rating agencies.” 
95
  According to the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) created by decision of the European 
Commission, the credit rating market should be ruled by industry standards more than by regulation: “CESR and 
market participants believe that there is no evidence that regulation of the credit rating industry would have had 
an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings of US subprime backed securities and hence continues to 
support market driven improvement. (…) CESR therefore urges the Commission as an immediate step to form an 
international CRAs standard setting and monitoring body to develop and monitor compliance with international 
standards in line with the steps taken by IOSCO.” Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), 
CESR’s Second Report to the European Commission on the compliance of credit rating agencies with the 
IOSCO Code and The role of credit rating agencies in structured finance, CESR/08-277, May 2008, p.3, 
http://www.cmvm.pt/CMVM/Cooperacao%20Internacional/Docs_ESMA_Cesr/Documents/CESR_08_277.pdf 
The European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) goes in the same direction and warns against the 
perverse effects of any undue regulation: “full formal regulation may be counter-productive as it might be seen 
by users in the market place to imply a level of official endorsement of ratings which is neither justified nor 
feasible. ESME does not consider it is possible for regulators to put themselves in a position where they can give 
that level of endorsement. Even the SEC’s authority in the US does not extend to the regulation of the substance 
of the credit ratings. Our view overall is that the incremental benefits of regulation would not exceed the costs 
and accordingly is not recommended.” European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME), The Role of Credit 
Rating Agencies ESME’s report to the European Commission, June 2008, p. 22, 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/report_040608_en.pdf).  the EU Commission also 
acknowledges the risk there is that full regulation of the credit rating analysis market would send an undesirable 
signal to the market: “references to ratings in the regulatory framework should be reconsidered in light of their 
potential to implicitly be regarded as a public endorsement of ratings and their potential to influence behavior in 
an undesirable way.” European Commission, Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Regulations often involves complex, protracted negotiations between the Commission, the 
Council, the Parliament and possibly national Parliaments.96  In addition, the intervention of 
several institutions offers vantage points to lobbyists.  Finally, reforms take long to pass 
through the legislative process, but they also take long to implement.  In the EU especially, 
regulatory reforms become only enforceable once transposed in the national legislation of the 
Member States.  This further delays the entry into force of regulatory remedies. 
3. The Advantages of Antitrust Intervention 
Besides being conceptually attractive, the competition rules could prove instrumentally useful 
in the credit rating industry. The competition rules indeed have five advantages over 
traditional regulatory instruments.  
First, antitrust investigations are subject to easy trigger mechanisms.  Investigations are 
launched upon complaints but also ex officio by competition authorities (“CAs”).  CAs do not 
need specific evidence of an infringement to open an investigation.  In the EU, the 
Commission can launch sector inquiries into a particular sector of the economy “where the 
trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity of prices or other circumstances suggest 
that competition may be restricted or distorted within the common market”.97  The 
Commission has often used this prerogative to investigate sectors where competition issues 
were much less obvious than in the credit rating industry (e.g. in the pharmaceutical sector).98  
Once the inquiry is opened, the Commission enjoys broad investigative powers. It can request 
firms subject to the investigation to provide all necessary information,99 take statements,100 
and inspect business premises.101  Failure to comply with the Commission’s requests can lead 
to the imposition of hefty fines and periodic penalty payments.102   
Second, antitrust infringement doctrines are flexible.  Like it or not, the scope of the 
competition rules found at Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is open-ended.  Pursuant to well-
settled case-law, the Treaty competition provisions do not prescribe an exhaustive 
                                                     
96
  As a result, controversial regulatory proposals are often abandoned for lack of support in one of those organs.  
More often, regulatory proposals will be watered down during the legislative process, and end-up at the lowest 
common denominator.   
97
 Article 17 of Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 2003, pp. 1–25. 
98
 N. Petit, “Bark at the Moon? - The outcome of the EC pharmaceutical sector inquiry”, Concurrences, N° 3-
2009, n°28154, pp. 11-25. 
99
 Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003, supra. 
100
 Article 19 of Regulation 1/2003 supra. 
101
 Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003 supra. 
102
 Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003 supra.   
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enumeration of unlawful behaviors.103  In addition, while the generalization of the “effects-
based” approach in EU competition law certainly raises the evidentiary burden that CAs have 
to overcome, it meanwhile extends the substantive scope of the competition rules to virtually 
any practice that produces anticompetitive effects, regardless of its form.104  As a result, the 
EU competition rules apprehend an increasingly wide number of business practices.  They 
may be used to challenge problematic business models, as they were in the Microsoft cases, 
where the Commission objected to technological product integration and forced Microsoft to 
modify its marketing policy.105  Also, the development of the collective dominance doctrine 
under Article 102 TFEU brings an increasing number of oligopolistic markets within the 
realm of the EU competition rules. 
Third, antitrust remedies are polymorphous. Once an infringement has been found, CAs can 
impose behavioral and/or structural remedies to bring it effectively to an end.106  Behavioral 
remedies force a firm to modify its business conduct, in the spirit of “command and control” 
regulation.  Structural remedies are similar to “regulatory takings” which change the 
allocation of property rights on the market, for instance through divestiture orders.107  In 
practice, such remedies may also be negotiated as part of a settlement between the parties and 
the Commission, in exchange for the early termination of the proceedings.108  To date, CAs 
have devised very innovative remedies in competition cases: obligation to disclose essential 
technical information to competitors in the Microsoft I case; divestiture of gas transmission 
networks in the ENI and RWE cases; obligations to provide full access to technical resolutions 
and related background documents used in the ship classification market in the International 
Association of Classification Societies case; decrease of the royalty rates charged for 
intellectual property rights in the Rambus case; reduction of the duration of contracts in the 
DSD case; etc.  The plasticity of competition remedies could thus prove useful in the credit 
rating industry, where reform proposals primarily purport to modify the CRAs’ “issuer pays” 
business model or to impose transparency obligations on ratings procedures/methodology, etc.  
                                                     
103
 ECJ, 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v. Commission, ECR 1973 p.215. 
104
 N. Petit, “From Formalism to Effects? The Commission's Communication on Enforcement Priorities  
in Applying Article 82 EC”, (2002) 32 World Competition, 485. Of course, there are still some formal 
requirements, such as proof of an “agreement, concerted practice or decision by association of undertakings” 
under Article 101 TFEU.  Yet, with the effects based approach, even such requirements tend to be less strict. 
105
 N. Petit and N. Neyrinck, “Back to Microsoft I and II: Tying and the Art of Secret Magic”, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice (2011) 2(2): 117-121. 
106
 Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, supra. 
107
 In principle, behavioral remedies should prevail over structural ones. Idem: “Structural remedies can only be 
imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective 
behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy”. 
108
 Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, supra.  
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Fourth, antitrust enforcement is very efficient.  Unlike regulatory reforms which are often 
contingent on subsequent national transposition, CAs’ decisions are directly applicable.  In 
addition, in the EU, competition decisions are crafted by independent CAs which operate at 
arm’s length from national governments and parliaments.  Hence, little of the interferences 
and delays described above arise in competition proceedings.109  Finally, compliance with the 
competition rules is mandatory, and is ensured through a system of stringent penalties which 
range from administrative fines on firms to individual sanctions (fines, director 
disqualification and jail sentences).110  At the EU level, firms guilty of an infringement of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU can be fined up to 10% of their annual global turnover.111  In 
addition, firms that do not comply with a Commission decision finding an infringement, 
ordering remedies or imposing commitments can be subject to periodic penalty payments of 
up to 5% of their daily global turnover.112  
Fifth, antitrust institutions are less exposed to risks of capture by interest groups than sector 
specific regulators.113  CAs exercise oversight duties over the entire spectrum of the economy.  
Their future is thus less dependent on the continued support of a particular industry.114  In 
addition, CAs only intervene intermittently in specific economic sectors.  Hence, CA officials 
share less personal bonds with industry members. Moreover, given their general expertise, 
they are less subject to “revolving doors” practices.  Those considerations are important in the 
financial industry, where suspicions of complacency by regulators vis-à-vis CRAs are 
common.115  
                                                     
109
 In fact, competition proceedings may only last a few months. This is particularly true in cases leading to 
commitments under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. 
110
 And this is not to mention the increased availability of damages for competition law infringements before the 
national courts. 
111
 Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, supra. 
112
 Article 24 of Regulation 1/2003, supra. 
113
 On regulatory capture, see G. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring, 1971, pp. 3-21 ; J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole,” The Politics of 
Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), 
1991, pp. 1089-1127. 
114
 M. Gal and I. Faibish, “Six Principles for Limiting Government-Facilitated Restraints on Competition” 44 (1) 
Common Market Law Review, January 2007, pp.9-10. 
115
 It is often said that the three-main CRAs have enjoyed numerous years of regulatory protection. In the 
meantime, CRAs made great efforts to delay the introduction of major changes to the current situation. It is 
indeed reported that CRAs invest many resources in public relations services and hire lobbyists to undermine 
legislative amendments. Two million dollars would be spent each year by S&P and Moody’s to pay lobbyists to 
oppose supervision over the agencies’ practices. C. Sanati, “Reed Attacks Lobbying Efforts by Ratings 
Agencies”, Dealbook, 6 April 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/reed-attacks-lobbying-efforts-by-
ratings-agencies/ ; A. Hallman, “For all the blame, credit raters still count on big banks for support”, 
iWatchNews, 21 April 2011 (http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/04/21/4286/all-blame-credit-raters-still-count-
big-banks-support); Welling@Wedden, “Egad! Egan-Jones”, Vol. 8, issue 12, 30 June 30 2006, p. 1 
(http://www.egan-jones.com/publicdocs/welling_egad_egan.pdf). 
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IV. Antitrust Intervention Scenarios 
A. Theoretical and Factual Background 
Up to this point, our analysis has made conceptual and practical arguments in support of 
antitrust scrutiny in the credit rating industry.  But the manifest lack of competition amongst 
CRAs does not suffice as such to trigger the application of the competition rules.  The same is 
true of the market structure of the credit rating industry.  Competition law does not prohibit 
market concentration as such, be it monopolistic or oligopolistic.  
In fact, antitrust law only bites in the presence of an additional behavioral element, i.e. a 
competition law offense.  Like most competition regimes, EU competition law prescribes two 
types of competition offense.  First, Article 101 TFEU prohibits anticompetitive collusion 
amongst independent undertakings.  Second, Article 102 TFEU declares unlawful the abusive 
conduct of dominant firms. 
A prerequisite for antitrust intervention in the credit rating industry is thus the existence of a 
course of conduct which fulfills the conditions of application of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.  It 
would be beyond the scope of this paper, and extremely difficult, to review the various 
activities of CRAs that may be tantamount to a competition law offense.116  Rather than 
attempting to draw lines in the water, we thus focus on whether CRAs’ recent downgrading 
suits of sovereign ratings can trigger antitrust liability.117   
At this stage, a number of additional factual clarifications are necessary.  Back in 2007, the 
CRAs were lambasted for (i) their blind optimism in relation to Subprime securities; and (ii) 
for the length it took them to warn investors of the dangers associated with such securities.  In 
the aftermath of the Subprime crisis, the pendulum swung.  CRAs became extremely 
pessimistic and anticipative in their ratings.118  This change towards a more ex ante approach 
of ratings magnified the possibility of errors.  With this new paradigm, CRAs are now 
suspected of devising flawed predictions (some talk of “self-fulfilling prophecies”).  Within 
the space of a few weeks, the big three CRAs successively downgraded the sovereign ratings 
of several European countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy) regardless of their lesser 
                                                     
116
 After all, most agreements, including cooperation agreements, participation in industry associations, etc. may 
raise competition issues. The same is true of other types of conduct, such as pricing, investment, marketing and 
R&D policies, etc., on which we barely have any information.  
117
 Our paper will therefore not deal with S&P’s alleged excessive pricing practices in relation to US 
International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs) in Europe (which triggered the opening of an 
investigation by the EU Commission in 2009). 
118
 R. Baghai, H. Servaes and A. Tamayo, “Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for 
Capital Structure and Debt Pricing”, June 2011, p. 2 
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exposure to default than securitized products (e.g. MBS, ABS, etc.).  Investors thus sold 
massive quantities of sovereign bonds, whose “pair” value winded down and whose “yield” 
skyrocketed.  In turn, downgraded countries in need of liquidity have been facing increased 
financial, economic and social difficulties, as if the initial prediction of the CRAs were 
correct.  The CRAs’ catastrophic predictions have triggered saber-rattling among many policy 
makers,119 but also among high-profile economists, etc.120  
With this background in mind, our main ambition in the following sections is to (i) formulate 
hypothetical theories of anticompetitive harm under both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; (ii) 
gauge their factual plausibility; and (iii) assess their legal vulnerability to competition 
proceedings.  To this end, we review in turn two hypotheses of unlawful, anticompetitive 
conduct: collusion (B) and abuse of dominance (C).  Given the lack of available information 
on CRAs’ market practices, the analysis is necessarily prospective, and thus in no way aspires 
to be exhaustive. 
B. Collusion 
Our first hypothetical scenario draws on the conspiracy theory.121  Almost inevitably, the 
similar timing and content of CRAs’ downgrading decisions raises suspicions of collusion.  
EU Commissioner Reding explicitly alluded to this with the following words: “It cannot be 
that a cartel of three U.S. firms decides the fate of whole economies and their citizens”.122   
There are several ways in which the “big three” CRAs may have colluded.  First, CRAs may 
have directly conspired to slash sovereign ratings.  In the alternative, CRAs may have 
indirectly colluded, through contacts with common customers or in the context of joint 
organizations (e.g. trade associations, joint ventures, etc.).  Surely, such collusion, if proven, 
would fall foul of Article 101 TFEU.  However, the strategic motives that could prompt CRAs 
to conspire along those lines remain unclear.  After all, collusion on downgrading is unlikely 
to improve CRAs’ profitability.123   
                                                     
119
 H. Van Rompuy, “Nous vivons une crise non pas de la zone euro mais de l'endettement public”, Le Monde, 
02.08.2011, talking of “laughable” assessments. 
120
 The Nobel Prize economist Christopher Pissarides has explicitly warned against the CRAs’ self-fulfilling 
prophecies. See  http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=11642 
121
 We leave aside the issue of a conspiracy amongst CRAs that would seek to protect the interest of the US at 
the expense of the EU, in some sort of economic struggle amongst giant superpowers.  The mere fact that S&P 




 And may even reduce profits, if rated States decide to remove business from them. 
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A second possible scenario involves larger-scale collusive activities, between CRAs and 
financial establishments active on other markets (e.g. banks, hedge funds, insurance 
companies).  The CRAs, together with several financial establishments, may have 
downgraded specific sovereign bonds in order to harm rival financial establishments that are 
excessively exposed to sovereign debt, i.e. those that purchased sovereign bonds from 
fiscally-exposed countries or that sold Credit Default Swaps on those bonds.124  The CRAs 
and the colluding banks may also be trying to inflate interests rates on sovereign bonds, with a 
view to increasing banks’ revenues and in turn CRAs’ ability to extract higher fees from 
ratings.125   
Again, both variants could trigger the applicability of Article 101 TFEU subject to proof of 
concerted conduct.  There is, however, a missing piece in the puzzle: why would CRAs favor 
certain financial establishments over others?  Besides the particular situation of Moody’s 
which is controlled by two investment firms active on the sovereign debt market,126  industry 
data says nothing of this.127   
This does not mean that the collusion hypothesis should be ruled out.  History suggests that 
the financial sector is not sheltered from collusion.  Economic studies have for instance hinted 
at collusive conduct between issuers and CRAs.128 Furthermore, antitrust agencies have 
themselves uncovered unlawful conspiracies in the financial sector.129  Should CAs be ready 
to investigate risks of collusion, they enjoy sufficient powers to bring the truth to light. 
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 C. Gatinois, “Pour les hedge funds, spéculer sur la dette souveraine peut rapporter très gros”, Le Monde, 13 
July 2011. This strategy would benefit to banks that anticipated the actual crisis and bought Credit Default 
Swaps as a guarantee against the possible failure of EU States. 
125
 Contrary to other debt issuers (e.g. firms, etc.), banks and financial groups that would be interested in 
increased interests rates have the power to obtain favors from CRAs: “Structured finance accounts for a major 
share of some rating agencies’ total revenues equally important, these amounts are paid by a small number of 
investment banks that know how to exploit their leverage”. J. Coffee, op. cit.,  
126
 The principal institutional owners of Moody's are Berkshire Hathaway and Davis Selected Advisers. 
Berkshire Hathaway is very active on the sovereign debt market. As of 2010, Berkshire owned $29 billion in 
fixed income securities, hold $2 billion of US government bonds and more than $10 billion of foreign 
government bonds (see Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Annual Report, 2010, p. 74, 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2010ar/2010ar.pdf). Davis Selected Advisers is an investment management 
firm which manages several funds. Among those funds, Davis manages a Government Bond Fund. The Fund’s 
strategy is to diversify among different types of government securities, maturity lengths, call provisions, and 
interest rate coupons. (see http://davisfunds.com/funds/government_fund/). 
127
 Beyond the fact that the CRAs have developed symbiotic relationships with banks and other financial 
institutions that are used to commission credit rating agencies to assess the value of their products. 
128
 M. Pagano and P. Volpin, op. cit., p.10, who allude to collusion between issuers and agencies to reveal only 
coarse information despite product complexity. 
129
 For instance, see EU Commission, Press Release, “Commission fines five German banks for fixing the price 
for the exchange of euro-zone currencies”, 11 December 2001, IP/01/1796. 
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C. Abuse of Dominance 
The credit rating industry exhibits high levels of concentration.  It is thus legitimate to ponder 
whether the CRAs occupy, individually or jointly, a dominant position (2) and, in turn, 
whether their ratings conduct is tantamount to an abuse under Article 102 TFEU (3).  Prior to 
this, we look briefly at the issue of market definition, and reach the conservative conclusion 
that there is a global market for sovereign ratings where the various CRAs compete (1).130 
1.  Market definition 
Credit rating agencies provide information on the creditworthiness of debt issuers.  In its 
widest acceptation, the relevant market could thus cover all those instruments that disclose 
information allowing investors to assess credit risk:131 financial journals, analyst reports, 
internal risk-assessment procedures, capital/solvency ratios, any appropriate combination of 
accounting indicators, etc.132 
Such a market definition is, however, overly broad.  Ratings issued by CRAs exhibit indeed 
several features that distinguish them from other information channels.  First, investors favor 
CRAs ratings because they enshrine information on the creditworthiness of the debt issuer in 
the present and in the future, by contrast to static accounting indicators.133  Second, portfolio 
governance and prudential regulation obligations require investors to hold financial products 
rated by CRAs.134  As a result, entities willing to issue bonds are thus obliged to purchase 
ratings from the CRAs,135  regardless of the existence of cheaper risk-assessment instruments.  
                                                     
130
 As explained previously, there is a key methodological distinction between sovereign and corporate ratings, 
which could justify treating the market for sovereign rating services as separate from the market for corporate 
credit rating services. 
131
 It is worth recalling that the relevant market “comprises all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer”. Neither the inaccuracy of the ratings, nor the 
irrationality of investors who stick with CRAs opinion whatever the cost should alter the market definition. 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ, 9 
December 1997, C 372/5, para. 7. 
132
 European Commission, Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies, 5 November 2010 p. 8. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/cra/cpaper_en.pdf). 
133
 S. Schaefer, "Stocks Plunge After S&P Downgrade of U.S. Rating”, Forbes, 8 August 2011 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2011/08/08/market-mauled-after-sp-downgrades-u-s-credit-rating/.  
134
 OECD, p.57. 
135
 Whatever the accuracy of these predictions – and despite ratings agencies’ recent track record of errors – 
market reactions to the announcements made by rating agencies evidence that most investors simply cannot do 
without CRAs prescriptions. J. Hunt, “Credit rating agencies and the worldwide credit crisis: the limits of 
reputation, the insufficiency of reform, and a proposal for improvement”, Columbia Business Law Review, 2009, 
1, pp. 109-209. 
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Within the market for rating services, a further distinction may be drawn between sovereign 
and corporate ratings.136  First, the customers of corporate and sovereign ratings are different, 
with on the one hand private sector organizations and, on the other hand, sovereign States able 
to raise taxes to fulfill their contractual obligations.137  Second, the rating of corporate and 
sovereign bonds involves distinct methodologies.  Whilst corporate rating requires the 
analysis of economic and accounting data only, sovereign rating necessitates a political 
assessment of a country’s willingness to repay its debts.  This implies additional working staff 
with specific expertise on social and political issues.138  In turn, this limits supply-side 
substitution,139 given that many CRAs other than the “big three” do not have the brainpower 
to rate sovereign bonds.   
Finally, sovereign ratings are information goods, which can be easily traded across borders.  
Hence, the market for sovereign ratings is global in scope.  
2. Dominance 
Under conventional Article 102 TFEU principles, the existence of dominant positions in the 
credit rating industry is not obvious.  However, CAs could rely upon less customary, yet 
applicable, antitrust law doctrines to find the CRAs in positions of single firm (2.1) or 
collective dominance (2.2). 
2.1. Single Firm Dominance 
At first glance, it seems doubtful that any of the three CRAs individually holds a dominant 
position.  Of course, the market is highly concentrated and characterized by high barriers to 
entry/expansion.  Yet, in principle, there is only one dominant player in a relevant market and 
this dominant player is necessarily the market leader.140  In the present case, the quasi-
                                                     
136
 That said, it must be acknowledged that the corporate and sovereign markets share a special relationship.  
Because of the reputation effects that characterize the rating industry, the market position the three big CRAs 
were able to achieve on the corporate rating market was leveraged into the market for sovereign ratings.  The 
appetite of investors for ratings from well-known agencies allowed the main CRAs to duplicate their market 
share on the neighboring market for sovereign ratings.  This makes the market for corporate rating a unique entry 
gate to the market for sovereign rating. 
137
 Ibidem, para. 43. 
138
 “The rating of sovereigns depends more on the art of political economy than on the science of econometrics. 
It depends on the careful judgement of experienced analysts about the durability of policy and the values of 
policy-makers as much as on a hard-nosed assessment of the prospects for a nation's export potential”. Fitch, 
Sovereign ratings. Rating methodology, p. 4 http://www.fitchratings.com.bo/UpLoad/methodology.pdf.   
139
 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market, op. cit., para. 20. 
140
 The market leader must outrank its rivals by some significant margin.  See Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty, op. cit., para. 20. 
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symmetrical market position of Moody’s and S&P rules out any finding of individual 
dominance.  
That said, from both a legal and economic standpoint, there is some sense in arguing that each 
of the “big three” CRAs – or perhaps only Moody’s and S&P – could exceptionally be 
deemed to enjoy an individual dominant position.  To start with the economics, we already 
explained that issuers seek to obtain at least two ratings, and sometimes three.141  This means 
that issuers do not view the ratings of the CRAs as substitutes for one another, but rather as 
complements to one another.  Consequently, it could be argued that each CRA operates on a 
stand-alone, captive market.  In turn, this means that each of the three CRAs – or at least 
Moody’s and S&P – is an “unavoidable trading partner” for issuers.142  Put differently, 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch would each enjoy a monopoly position, on their own market.  
Turning to the law, CAs and courts could possibly delineate distinct relevant markets for the 
various CRAs, and find that each of them occupies a dominant position under Article 102 
TFEU.  Alternatively, and more controversially, CAs could draw inspiration from the 
Commission’s decision in ABG/Oil Companies operating in the Netherlands in which several 
rival companies operating in the same market were found to enjoy a dominant position 
relative to their respective customers.143  This line of reasoning has, however, never been used 
in subsequent Article 102 TFEU cases.  That said, there is some precedential authority in the 
case-law to find single firm dominant positions in the credit rating industry. 
2.2. Collective Dominance 
Article 102 TFEU applies to tight oligopolies via the doctrine of “collective dominance”.  In 
practice, the Commission has seemed reluctant (if not allergic) to using this doctrine in 
oligopolistic markets.144  However, despite the Commission’s reticence, the EU Courts have 
repeatedly stated that a dominant position may be “held by two or more economic entities 
legally independent of each other, provided that from an economic point of view they present 
themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective entity (emphasis added)”.145 
Besides, at the national level, some CAs have built a solid track record in this field.  Given the 
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 Regulatory frameworks may require issuers to obtain multiple ratings prior to offering bonds on the market. 
142
 The concept of “unavoidable trading partner” comes from the seminal judgment of the ECJ in C-85/76, 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, [1979] E.C.R.461, para 41. 
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 Commission Decision, 77/327/EEC of 19 April 1977, IV/28.841 – ABG/Oil companies operating in the 
Netherlands, OJ L 117, 09.05.1977, pp. 1-16. 
144
 Except in very specific circumstances. On this, see N. Petit, Oligopoles, collusion tacite et droit 
communautaire de la concurrence, Bruylant-LGDJ 2007, Chapitre II. 
145
 Ibidem, para. 110. 
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tight oligopolistic structure of the credit rating industry, it is thus legitimate to examine 
whether the CRAs hold a collective dominant position. 
At its core, the notion of collective dominance covers those oligopolistic markets on which 
rivals can coordinate their conduct (e.g. price, output, investments, etc.) without entering into 
an explicit collusive arrangement. Economists refer to this phenomenon with the oxymoron 
“tacit collusion”.   
Under Article 102 TFEU, a finding of collective dominance requires: (i) a certain degree of 
parallel behavior amongst oligopolists (the notion of “collective entity”); and (ii) the 
satisfaction of the three conditions articulated by the General Court in Laurent Piau v. 
Commission, i.e.: 
“Three cumulative conditions must be met for a finding of collective dominance: first, each 
member of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know how the other members are 
behaving in order to monitor whether or not they are adopting the common policy; second, the 
situation of tacit coordination must be sustainable over time, that is to say, there must be an 
incentive not to depart from the common policy on the market; thirdly, the foreseeable 
reaction of current and future competitors, as well as of consumers, must not jeopardise the 
results expected from the common policy.”146  
Unfortunately, subsequent case-law provides no guidance on the interpretation of those 
conditions.  In previous cases, the Commission and the EU Courts have established collective 
dominance on the basis of a less sophisticated assessment, which involved the review of a 
“checklist” of pro-collusive market characteristics or through the proof of “structural links” 
amongst oligopolists (e.g. agreements, shareholdings, etc.).  Moreover, in Impala v. 
Commission, the Court stressed that:  
“in the context of the assessment of the existence of a collective dominant position, although 
the three conditions [...] which were inferred from a theoretical analysis of the concept of a 
collective dominant position, are indeed also necessary, they may, however, in the appropriate 
circumstances, be established indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of 
indicia and items of evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in 
the presence of a collective dominant position.” 
Now, on the facts, the two components of collective dominance are prima facie present.  First, 
parallel behavior is a salient feature of the credit rating industry.147  The sovereign debt crisis 
offers daily illustrations of this, with CRAs repeatedly adjusting their ratings on their 
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 CFI (now General Court), 26 January 2005, Laurent Piau v Commission, T-193/02, E.C.R., 2005, p. II-209, 
para. 111. 
147
 R. Cantor and F. Packer, op. cit. , p. 3: As early as 1994, the parallel behavior of the two main agencies was 
perceivable. In the wake of the financial crisis in Mexico, S&P had rated Mexico with a positive outlook for 
upgrade before downgrading its assessment to align it with that of  Moody’s. 
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competitors’.  In the same vein, several scholarly studies record systematic patterns of 
“mimetism”, “inertia”, “herd behavior”148 and “piggybacking effect”149 in the credit rating 
industry:150  successive credit ratings tend to converge after publication;151  upgrade 
probabilities are much higher, and downgrade probabilities are much lower, for a sovereign 
issuer with a recent upgrade by another agency;152  rating changes by a rating agency are also 
significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by a first rating agency.153   
Second, the features of the credit ratings sector support a tacit collusion hypothesis.  To name 
only a few of them, the industry exhibits:  
 a small number of oligopolists; 
 similar activities in range, nature and variety;154 
 identical business models, with the “big three” CRAs operating under the “issuer 
pays” model; 
 similar fees155 and similar “list prices”; 156 
                                                     
148
 Herd behavior can be compounded by managers incentives (reputational issues and sharing the blame in case 
of errors). D. Scharfstein and J. Stein, “Herd Behavior and Investments”, (1990)  Vol 80, N°3, American 
Economic Review,465,  
149
 P. Gomas, Do credit rating agencies piggyback? Evidence from sovereign debt ratings, 19 June 2011, p. 19 
(Preliminary draft). What has been described as a “piggybacking effect” has numerous, crucial implications: 
“First, errors of one agency contaminate the rating of other agencies. Second, if ratings are reported in a 
categorical scale, piggybacking leads to inertia and herd behaviour. Even if one agency perceives a 
deterioration of the creditworthiness, it might be reluctant to act if the rivals do not. It will only downgrade if it 
receives a strong negative signal. On the other hand, once one agency acts, it might generate waves of 
subsequent adjustments. Third, if agencies are themselves averaging their ratings, investors can get wrong idea 
about the variance of the signals. 
150
 Of course, the CRAs occasionally disagree on ratings, but this is often confined to one or two notches on their 
finer scale. P. Hill, R. Brooks and R. Faff, “Variations in sovereign credit quality assessments across rating 
agencies”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, 2010, p. 1327.  Moreover, divergences seem more frequent for 
sovereign ratings than for corporate ratings: “The disagreements across agencies represent more than half of all 
observations, except in the case of the S&P/Fitch pair. (…) The high frequency of disagreements across agencies 
can be explained by rating agencies using varying methodologies, different quantitative/qualitative factors and 
different weights on these factors in assigning sovereign ratings. Rating agencies may also disagree to a greater 
extent about speculative grade rated issuers (more opaque issuers with a high degree of instability and poor 
information quality), which represent 46.4% of the total number of observations. In addition, agencies may have 
better knowledge about countries in their “home region”, and thus assign favourable ratings for issuers located 
there.” R. Al-Sakka and O. ap Gwilym, “Split sovereign ratings and rating migrations in emerging economies”, 
Emerging Markets Review, 11, 2010, p. 95. 
151
 R. Al-Sakka and O. ap Gwilym, “Split sovereign ratings and rating migrations in emerging economies”, op. 
cit., p. 95. 
152
 And vice-versa.  R. Al-Sakka and O. ap Gwilym, “Leads and lags in sovereign credit ratings”, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 34, 2010) 2614–2626: “S&P tends to demonstrate the least dependence on other agencies, 
and Moody’s tends to be the first mover in upgrades. Rating actions by Japanese agencies tend to lag those of 
the larger agencies, although there is some evidence that they lead Moody’s downgrades”.  
153
 A. Guttler and M. Wahrenburg, “The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults”, Journal of Banking 
& Finance , 31, 2007, p. 751. 
154
 “As of September 2005, S&P had credit rating opinions outstanding on approximately $30 trillion of debt, 
including 745,000 securities issued by roughly 42,000 obligors in more than 100 countries.27 Moody’s numbers 
were roughly the same.” F. Partnoy, op. cit., p. 66. 
155
 Idem, p. 66. 
156
 Moody’s and S&P are also said to charge similar fees and to have adopted similar “list prices”. The structure 
of Fitch issuers’ fee schedules is similar to that of Moody’s and S&P. “Both Moody's and S&P have the 
following "list prices" for the requested ratings: 3.25 basis points on issues up to $500 million, with a minimum 
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 similar cost structures and similar human resources (in size);157 
 close rating methodologies;158    
 high market transparency, with the publication of credit ratings, contacts with common 
customers and through the participation to several professional associations;159  
 
Moreover, the three conditions of Laurent Piau v. Commission may well be satisfied.  First, 
CRAs can easily monitor each other’s ratings, in light of the high degree of transparency that 
prevails on the market.  Second, CRAs’ incentives to follow each other’s behavior can be 
sustained through the threat of price wars or other retaliation mechanisms (poaching of key 
personnel, e.g. internal analysts), etc.  Finally, the likelihood of entry/expansion is presumably 
low, given the high obstacles that potential/actual rivals must overcome to penetrate the 
market.  The persistence of large profit margins in the credit rating industry corroborates this 
last proposition.160  Overall, the collective dominance/tacit collusion hypothesis is thus 
plausible.   
3. Abuse 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
Given that both the individual and collective dominance hypothesis can be sustained, it is now 
time to turn to the issue of abuse.  Under well-settled case law, it is not per se unlawful to 
hold a dominant position.  However, firms occupying a dominant position cannot behave as 
they see fit on the market.  Dominant firms have a “special responsibility not to allow [their] 
conduct to impair competition on the common market”.161   In layman’s words, certain forms 
of legitimate business conducts of non-dominant firms are forbidden to dominant firms in 
view of their likely or actual anticompetitive effects.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
fee of $25,000 and a maximum of $125,000 (S&P) or $130,000 (Moody's); both charge an additional 2 basis 
points on amounts above $500 million (S&P caps the amount at $200,000; it also has a one-time fee of $25,000 
for first-time issuers).  Both offer negotiated rates for frequent issuers and offer quarterly charges on amounts 
outstanding for issuers of commercial paper. (…) The structure of [Fitch and Duff&Phelps] issuers' fee schedule 
is similar to that of Moody's and S&P; but, as would be expected from firms that are perceived to be more 
peripheral, their fee levels are lower (2.5 basis points for Fitch IBCA; 2.75 basis points for Duff & Phelps)”.  
L. White, The credit rating industry: an industrial organization analysis, op. cit., p. 14. 
157
 S&Ps ratings operations are roughly of the same size as Moody’s, while Fitch is somewhat smaller.  All three 
companies employ about the same numbers of analysts. L. White, “The Credit Rating Agencies”, op. cit., p. 216. 
158
 The three main CRAs have similar methodologies for corporate rating. There are more divergences on 
sovereign rating, though. 
159
 For instance, the CRAs cooperate within the context of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (“IOSCO”), an association of organisations that regulates the world’s securities and futures 
markets.  For more, see http://www.iosco.org/ 
160
 This despite repeated criticism of stakeholders from all sides. 
161
 ECJ, Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983], E.C.R. p.3461, para. 
10. 
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The scope of the concept of abuse is open-ended.  In essence, however, Article 102 TFEU 
outlaws conduct which harms the competitive structure of markets through the foreclosure of 
other firms, be they competitors – first line injury abuses – or economic partners (customers 
or suppliers active on neighboring markets) – secondary line injury abuses – of the dominant 
firm.  Those abuses are often labeled “exclusionary abuses”.   
First line injury abuses appear, for instance, in predatory pricing cases, where a dominant firm 
prices below costs to subdue as efficient rivals.  Secondary line injury abuses occur, for 
instance, in price discrimination cases, where a dominant firm charges different tariffs to its 
customers, and thereby inflicts on some of them a competitive disadvantage.  In recent years, 
many authors (including the author of this paper) have criticized the lax conditions required in 
the case-law to prove an unlawful abuse under Article 102 TFEU.  Those relatively lax 
requirements could, however, play to the CAs’ advantage, should they be willing to 
investigate the conduct of CRAs under Article 102 TFEU.   
Besides exclusionary abuses, Article 102 TFEU also prohibits so-called “exploitative abuses”:  
conduct whereby a dominant firm exploits its SMP, and harms directly its customers, through 
excessive prices, output reductions, poor product/service quality, etc.  In brief, such abuses 
cover the several inefficiencies traditionally ascribed by economic theory to monopoly power. 
3.2. Rating Errors 
Ever since their inception, CRAs’ have been criticized for misguided decisions, as if errors 
were an endemic feature of the industry.162  In recent times, observers have lambasted CRAs 
for repeated type I errors (erroneous downgrading or under-rating).  Alluding to S&P’s recent 
downgrading of the US rating – which was fraught with a daft mathematical mistake of 
approximately $2 trillion –163  P. Krugmann, a Nobel prize economist, talked of “amateur 
hour”.164  Likewise, up until the fall-out of the Subprime crisis, CRAs have been criticized for 
repeated type II errors (erroneous upgrading or over-rating).  In this context, one may thus 
legitimately question whether such errors are likely to fall foul of Article 102 TFEU. 
                                                     
162
 To reverse this argument, CRAs often claim that pursuing them is like blaming the thermometer for the 
temperature. Some observers have also described CRAs as mere “messengers”, and argued that it would make 
no sense to shoot the messenger.  But this is wholly unpersuasive. CRAs ratings do not convey crude 
information.  They embody analysis, value judgment and interpretation, just as a doctor’s diagnosis does after 
taking a patient’s temperature.  Seen as a diagnosis, credit ratings may thus be flawed. 
163
 See http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Just-the-Facts-SPs-2-Trillion-Mistake.aspx 
164
 See http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/i-heard-it-through-the-baseline/ 
Work in progress – Please do not quote without permission of the author 
  35 
There are several senses in which CRAs’ ratings errors may be akin to unlawful abuses under 
Article 102 TFEU.  First, and to focus only on type I errors, with the mistaken downgrading 
of selected sovereign ratings, CRAs risk injuring the structure of related financial markets, by 
pushing sovereign-exposed financial establishments (banks, insurance companies, etc.) 
towards bankruptcy.165  As in secondary line injury cases, this is likely to increase 
concentration on neighboring markets, weaken competition and harm consumer welfare.  
Beyond this, the harm caused to competition with the disappearance of specific market 
players may trigger increased financial instability.166   
Second, the downgrading of certain countries – despite the drastic economic reforms and 
austerity measures undertaken in those countries – and the relative immunity of other 
countries – despite dire economic situations – may be a form of subjective discriminatory 
conduct,167 which inflicts a competitive disadvantage on holders of downgraded bonds.   
Finally, rating errors can also be akin to exploitative abuse to the extent that they reflect the 
structural failure of dominant firms to supply efficient services.  Given the absence of 
competitors, rating errors do not translate into losses in market share, likely to discipline the 
CRAs.  Moreover, dominant CRAs, insulated from competition, need not improve, let alone 
correct, flawed rating methodologies.   
Not unlike our analysis of dominance, we acknowledge that our assessment of abuse is 
unconventional, and departs from mainstream Article 102 TFEU analysis.  We thus recognize 
that running an Article 102 TFEU case along those lines would probably require a good 
amount of “political” courage.   
This notwithstanding, our interpretation of Article 102 TFEU is based on established 
competition policy principles.  First, it is wholly consistent with the Court’s case-law (i) in 
price discrimination cases, which seeks primarily to avoid distortions of competition on 
                                                     
165
 Note that type II errors generate similar concerns, as they induce investors to take excessive risks, and thus 
weaken their competitive position.  The explanation for the rating agencies’ conduct can perfectly be framed in 
the words used by (i) behavioral economists to describe irrational conduct – why hammer Greece and Portugal, 
and meanwhile maintain the US’ AAA? – in markets where players are excessively risk averse; or (ii) 
conventional economists to describe information imperfections and reputation dynamics (to stay 
credible, agencies need to be tough on rating). 
166
 The contagion dynamics on financial markets are abundantly documented in the scholarship and official 
reports.  
167
 At the end of the day, the rating implies a subjective assessment of the creditworthiness of the issuer . It 
leaves an important margin of appreciation left to the analyst. This is all the more so when it comes to the rating 
of sovereign debt, where an assessment of the “political willingness to pay” must be undertaken.  
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markets where the dominant firm is not active (secondary-line injury);168 and (ii) in other 
types of cases (refusal to deal, rebates, etc.), where dominant firms have been condemned for 
eliminating trading parties in markets where they were not active.169  For instance, in British 
Airways (“BA”), the General Court objected to the fact that the various travel agents that 
purchased tickets to BA received different rebates. The Court held that such a discriminatory 
rebate scheme,170 could distort competition on the downstream market for air travel agency 
services and was thus abusive.171  Albeit implicitly, the Commission confirmed this in its 
Discussion Paper on Article 102 TFEU.  It suggested that abuse concerns could arise if the 
elimination of a market player led to collusion in the secondary market, or if the eliminated 
market player was a key source of rivalry (e.g. a maverick player).172 
Second, it tallies with the Commission’s goals under the State aid rules, where bailouts to 
failing firms are (i) generally authorized out of concerns of increased oligopolistic 
concentration;173  and (ii) specifically cleared in the banking industry, for fear of increased 
financial instability and risks of contagion.174   
Finally, Regulation 1/2003 entitles national CAs to adopt decisions that go beyond customary 
Article 102 TFEU principles.175  National CAs, could thus draw inspiration from the above to 
run novel, creative theories of harm under domestic abuse of dominance law. 
3.3. Extortionate Ratings 
CRAs occasionally issue unsolicited ratings.176  Unsolicited ratings are credit ratings not 
initiated at the request (and with the cooperation) of the relevant issuer.177  In the aftermath of 
                                                     
168
 D. Geradin and N. Petit, “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law – Another Doctrine in Search of 
Limiting Principles?” (2006) 2(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 479. 
169
 See, for instance, ECJ, Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. 
Commission, [1978] ECR 207. 
170
 GC (previously CFI), British Airways plc v Commission, 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 2003, p. II-
05917, para. 233-240. 
171
 Ibidem. By remunerating at different levels services that were nevertheless identical the rebates schemes 
distorted the level of remuneration which the travel agents received. “Being dependent on the financial resources 
of each agent, that ability of agents to compete in supplying air travel agency services to travellers and to 
stimulate the demand of airlines for such services was naturally affected by the discriminatory conditions of 
remuneration inherent in BA's performance reward schemes”. Hence, BA’s rebates schemes were held to be an 
abuse of a dominant position, “in that they produced discriminatory effects within the network of travel agents 
established in the United Kingdom, thereby inflicting on some of them a competitive disadvantage”.  
172
 See DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuse, 
Brussels, December 2005, para. 222-223. 
173
 Communication from the Commission — Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring 
firms in difficulty, OJ 244 , 01.10.2004, pp.2-17, para. 31. 
174
 T. Beck, D. Coyle, M. Dewatripont, X. Freixas and P. Seabright, “Bailing out the Banks:  Reconciling 
Stability and Competition – An analysis of state-supported schemes for financial institutions”, CEPR 2010. 
175
 Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, supra. 
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the Subprime crisis, regulators have encouraged unsolicited ratings in order to mitigate the 
nefarious effects “issuer pays” conflict of interest.  In addition, regulators have entitled non-
officially recognized CRAs to issue such ratings, in a bid to foster transparency, information 
availability and differentiation on the market.  A number of sovereign ratings are unsolicited, 
but not all of them.178   
In practice, unsolicited ratings are often below solicited ratings.  Observers have thus voiced 
concerns that CRAs may deliberately issue negative unsolicited ratings in order to push 
issuers to solicit ratings.179  As explained by Partnoy “the agency threatens the issuer with 
unfavorable ratings to obtain fees now”.180  The problem here is that someone is forced to 
purchase a service he does not want, and has to divert resources away from alternative, more 
valuable, uses.181  We refer to this as extortionate ratings. 
When practiced by dominant CRAs, extortionate ratings may have two types of 
anticompetitive effect. First, the influx of new customers caused by negative unsolicited 
ratings increases the size of the CRAs’ (individual/collective) dominant position, and in turn 
the magnitude of the various inefficiencies arising from its (their) SMP.182  Second, dominant 
CRAs reduce the contestable share of the market that can be served by prospective new 
entrants, by locking-in customers that were not previously tied in by contractual 
commitments.  In so doing, the dominant CRAs protect their (individual/collective) dominant 
position.183   
On close examination, the case-law of the EU courts to date provides no precedent in relation 
to such types of abuse.  Forced purchasing has only been prohibited to the extent that it was 
                                                                                                                                                                      
176
 See http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/07/28/300116/the-unpredictability-of-the-unsolicited-rating/ 
177
 Regulation No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit 
rating agencies, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1–31, recital 21: “An unsolicited credit rating, namely a credit rating 
not initiated at the request of the issuer or rated entity, should be clearly identified as such and should be 
distinguished from solicited credit ratings by appropriate means”. 
178
 See http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/02/17/491736/gratuitous-sovereign-aaa/  
179
 W. Poon, “Are unsolicited credit ratings biased downward?”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 27, Issue 4, 
April 2003, pp. 593-614; W. POON and M/ FIRTH, “Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower? International 
Evidence From Bank Ratings”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 32, Iss. 9-10, November 2005, 
pp.1741–1771. 
180
 F. Partnoy, op. cit., p. 72. 
181
  This is a source of allocative inefficiency. 
182
 One could however argue that this is likely to generate productive efficiency.  With an increased customer 
base, CRAs will achieve economies of scale and reduce their production costs. 
183
 Interestingly, CRAs often claim that unsolicited ratings mainly serve as a signaling device, to prove that they 
even have expertise in markets in which they have no significant presence.  The publication of unsolicited 
ratings is used here as a marketing instrument.  C. Bannier, P. Behr and A. Gäuttler, “Why are unsolicited ratings 
lower than solicited ratings? A theoretical and empirical assessment”, 28 April 2007, p. 2 
(http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de/master/brown/181.pdf).  
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the result of a tying strategy under Article 102 (d) TFEU (where the sale of good X is 
conditioned on the purchase of good Y).  That said, extortionate ratings may be sanctioned for 
its exploitative effects, in the spirit of the prohibition of “unfair purchase conditions” under 
Article 102 (a) TFEU.  In addition, extortionate ratings may also constitute a new breed of 
exclusionary abuse under Article 102 (b) TFEU.  If dominant firms can be condemned when 
they attract new customers through low prices (in abusive rebates and predatory pricing 
cases), it seems justified to sanction them when they reach the same result through 
mischievous practices.184  
3.4. Other Possible Abuses 
In addition to the ratings-related abuses discussed above, a wide array of other commercial 
practices of the CRAs’ may fall within the purview of Article 102 TFEU: exclusivity 
obligations, long-term contracts, tying/bundling of services, unfair contract terms, loyalty 
discounts, etc.  Absent further information on CRAs’ commercial practices, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore their compatibility with Article 102 TFEU.  But an antitrust 
investigation could possibly shed light on a number of abusive practices which, to date, have 
not yet surfaced on the radar screen of CAs. 
D. Competition Advocacy 
Short of a competition infringement – and of enforcement initiatives by CAs – it would still 
be perfectly legitimate for CAs to undertake a competitive assessment of the credit rating 
sector.185  Indeed, competition agencies are well placed to ascertain the causes, consequences 
and solutions to “competition problems” in specific industries.186  They should in turn use – 
they actually often do – their expertise to advocate before policy makers regulatory reforms 
that foster competition.  The former Director General of DG COMP, Philip Lowe, 
summarized this in saying: “One thing the crisis has served to highlight is the importance of 
good regulation and the need to expand our sphere of influence from beyond the narrow 
                                                     
184
 The case-law on sham action (Astra Zeneca) and on other deceptive practices (Rambus) seems to support this 
contention. 
185
 See, in the same sense, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 21st Report of Session 2010–12, 
Sovereign Credit Ratings: Shooting the Messenger?, 21 July 2011, para. 100: “There is a compelling argument 
for a thorough competition inquiry into the structure and regulation of the credit rating industry. This inquiry 
should consider the full range of ideas proposed to increase competition in the sector”. 
186
 They boast expert staff and, in contrast to industry regulators, are less prone to capture. The concept of 
“competition problem”, as opposed to competition infringement, was used by P. Lowe, in a speech available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_15_en.pdf 
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confines of our specialist field”.187  In the EU, Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 offers a legal 
basis to this end.188  In the past, DG COMP relied on this provision to make proposals for 




Beyond the prohibition of unlawful agreements and abuses, CAs can impose on parties – or 
negotiate with them – behavioral and structural measures.  Importantly, those remedies must 
be competition-related, i.e. they must correct and eliminate infringements of the competition 
rules.   
Besides the legal principles of proportionality and effectiveness, imagination seems to be the 
sole limitation on admissible remedies in competition law.  In the section that follows, we 
thus try to explore a few possible remedies, drawing inspiration from the wealth of policy 
proposals that have come to light in recent weeks.  Again, the analysis here is wholly 
prospective, and thus does not intend to be exhaustive.  
B. Remedies creating or assisting “competitive forces” External to the Oligopoly 
Recent policy proposals call for the creation of one (or more) new CRA(s), to assuage 
concerns that the “big three” CRAs’ flawed appraisals are never disputed by external opinions 
(or sanctioned by customers).  
The decision-making practice of CAs contains many examples of remedies seeking to 
destabilise a tight oligopoly, through the creation of new “competitive forces”.  In the credit 
rating industry, such remedies could be instrumental in helping potential entrants gain a 
foothold in the market place.190  Amongst possible examples, one can think of compulsory 
                                                     
187
 Idem, p.9. 
188
 Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, supra: “Where the trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity of 
prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the common market, 
the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular type of 
agreements across various sectors. In the course of that inquiry, the Commission may request the undertakings 
or associations of undertakings concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty and may carry out any inspections necessary for that purpose”. 
189
 For an overview, see N. Petit and C. Lousberg, “Enquêtes sectorielles : Complément ou substitut de l’action 
des autorités de concurrence ? Le « Couteau suisse » du droit européen de la concurrence ?” Concurrences, N°2-
2010, pp. 19-28. 
190
 Interestingly, the benefit of those remedies could be extended to investors, so they can establish their own, 
internal rating capacities.  They could also benefit public CRAs’, if it is ever decided, as proposed by several 
policy makers, to create such organs. We observe here that a public rating agency would probably lack 
independence and credibility insofar as the rating of sovereign bonds is concerned. 
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trademark licenses on CRAs, in order to help potential entrants overcome reputational 
disadvantages.  In the same vein, CRAs may be ordered to disclose information on ratings 
procedures and methodology, so as to assist potential entrants overcome informational 
disadvantages.  Likewise, CRAs may be required to terminate existing contractual 
relationships with a number of issuers, with a view to creating market opportunities for new 
entrants.  Finally, and as a last resort remedy, CAs could request the main CRAs to sell some 
of their assets to potential competitors, through a divestiture.191 
Of course, the corrective virtue of competition remedies goes hand in hand with several 
drawbacks.  First, most of those remedies exhibit endogenous shortcomings.  Trademark 
licenses convey risks of collusion amongst licensors and licensees.  Compulsory disclosure 
remedies may deter innovation in the setting of new assessment methodologies.192  
Divestitures entail possible productive inefficiencies (loss of economies of scale in 
particular).193   
Second, those remedies have exogenous limitations.  First, they are contingent on the 
existence of entrepreneurs, ready to enter the market.  Second, as long as the new entrants are 
not officially recognized as rating institutions in national regulatory frameworks, the impact 
of their entry on the market will remain limited. 
C. Remedies seeking to reduce Risks of Ratings Errors 
As seen above, there is a widespread concern that ratings errors are pervasive.  Rating errors 
include type I errors (unjustified downgrading or under grading), type II errors (unjustified 
upgrading or over grading) and ratings discrimination.  On a cursory analysis, it can be argued 
that rating errors give rise to a competition problem, because they translate into 
anticompetitive effects on adjacent markets where financial establishments operate.194  To 
take the words of economists, ratings errors generate negative externalities on financial 
establishments exposed to sovereign debt.   
                                                     
191
 Structural remedies of this kind are not uncommon in competition law. See  United States v. AT&T, 552 
F.Supp. 131 (DDC 1982). In EU competition law, such remedies can only be adopted upon proof that there is no 
behavioral remedy of equal effectiveness. 
192
 L. White, “The Credit Rating Agencies”, op. cit., p. 223.  There is, however, a shortcoming here: in the long-
term, such approach could deter innovation in the setting of new assessment methodologies. 
193
 R. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center Working Paper No. 01-05, 2001, 89. 
194
 Insofar as type II errors are concerned, the risk is that holders of unduly upgraded securities are incentivized 
to take excessive risks. 
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Several remedies can be envisioned to reduce risks of rating errors.  Whilst some of them are 
clearly beyond the reach of competition rules (stricter civil and criminal liability rules in cases 
of errors, publication of a “ranking” of CRAs, etc.), others such as the transition from the 
“issuer pays” model to the “investor pays” model; or the adoption of “shaming” commitments 
in case of ratings errors, could arguably be adopted pursuant to them. 
Remedies may also be ordered to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of ratings errors.  In this 
variant, CRAs could be requested to use larger ratings scales, which limit the magnitude of 
downgrades and send less radical signals to investors.  CRAs could also be subject to 
downgrading “floors” or “shutdown obligations”, when a country benefits from financial 
rescue measures under an international programme.195   
D. Remedies seeking to eliminate Coordination within the Oligopoly 
Convergence is a prominent feature of the credit rating industry.  To undermine this, CAs 
could seek to generally eradicate collaborative opportunities between incumbent CRAs, 
through the severance of commercial and structural links (contracts, cross-shareholdings, 
interlocking directorates, participation in trade associations, etc.).  Such links are often 
deemed to facilitate explicit or tacit collusion. 
Besides this, more targeted – yet heavy-handed – remedies could be envisioned.  For instance, 
CAs could ban CRAs from publishing ratings.196  In this model, CRAs would send their 
ratings to a designated institution (the CA itself or a trustee), whose role would be to publish 
the ratings of the various CRAs simultaneously.   The simultaneous publication of ratings 
would prevent CRAs from relying on the assessment made by their rivals to frame their own 
results.  
VI. Conclusion 
The recent concern for media pluralism in the United Kingdom following the BSKYB debacle 
brings a welcome reminder that when it comes to information, there is some strength in 
numbers.  Arguably, the same applies to the credit rating industry where, for too long, ratings 
are assigned by three entrenched players whose mistakes remain entirely unpunished.  
                                                     
195
 An idea initially suggested by France’s former finance minister, Ms. C. Lagarde. See Nikki Tait, EU eyes 
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There are both conceptual and practical arguments in support of opening a general antitrust 
investigation into the credit rating industry (at least to complement current regulatory 
debates).  In the past, antitrust inquiries have been opened in sectors where competition 
concerns were much less glaring.197  Furthermore, the Commission is currently investigating 
S&P in relation to the licensing of US International Securities Identification Numbers.198  In 
light of all this, the decision to open a sector-wide competition investigation – which lies in 
the hands of CAs’ high-ranking officials – thus seems to rest on one single parameter: 
political courage…199 
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